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There have been a number of incidences reported for pipeline failures at both onshore and 
offshore facilities. In order to minimize the failure causes, it is required to clearly 
understand the failure mechanism, probability and consequences of failure and also the 
methodology for data to be analyzed. This thesis was based on an Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) to determine the risk factors of pipeline failure. AHP provide a multiple 
criteria scoring results based on expert judgment for prioritizing the maintenance of the 
pipeline. To perform the AHP approach, two pipeline systems have been chosen for case 
studies was located in Kertih, Malaysia and Kutai Basin, Indonesia.  
 
Analysis of the AHP process showed that the gas pipeline in Kertih involves greatest risk 
failure covers probabiliy and consequences. The highest probability is internal corrosion 
of 41.7% and the rest is caused by internal erosion of 19.1%, external impacts of 13.8 %, 
external corrosion of 10.7%, free span of 8.1%, and on bottom stability of 6.7%. The 
greatest consequences of pipeline failure would impact on the environment of 59.4%, and 
the others will be the impact on economic of 24.9% and safety of 15%. On the other hand 
the highest probability for oil pipeline at Kutai Basin is caused by system operation of 
34.7% and the other factors are design index of 23.7%, maintenance of  23.7%, and third 
party index of 18%. The greatest consequences will be on business of 60%, the second 
impact is environment of 20% and the last impact is on population of 20%.  
 
Based on these two pipelines systems then the moderation for probability and 
consequence of failure have been determined.  The result of analysis shows in general the 
factor of probability and consequence of failure are similar in various pipeline areas. By 
clearly knowing and understanding the probability and consequences of pipeline failure, 
then the risk level and category can be determined. From this analysis the pipelines can be 
ranked according to risk will assists the prioritization of pipelines maintenance. The   
inspection and maintenance budgets would be more effectively plan by setting priorities 
based on these pipelines risk. Those pipelines with higher risk should be given more 





The AHP method has been compared to the existing method in formulating the pipeline 
maintenance, from the analysis the detail and complete result for AHP has been showed. 
AHP can exactly show the factors that may cause the pipeline failure based on the 
structure of hierarchy of risk pipeline failure and categorize the risk into risk category so 
that proper maintenance can be determined. Where as in the existing method the 
maintenance plans only based on inspection and comparison of each factor has not been 


























Ada beberapa insiden kegagalan pipeline yang tercatat di fasiliti pantai dan lepas pantai. 
Dalam langkah perancangan untuk meminimumkan punca kegagalan ini adalah penting 
dalam memahami mekanisme kegagalan, kemungkinan dan kesan-kesan kegagalan 
tersebut dan juga metodologi data untuk dianalisiskan. Tesis ini berdasarkan kaedah 
Analitic Hirarki Proses (AHP) untuk memastikan risiko faktor-faktor kegagalan pipeline. 
AHP menyediakan beberapa kriteria yang terbesar berdasarkan penilaian pakar dalam 
mengutamakan penyelenggaran pipeline. Untuk mengendalikan kaedah AHP, dua sistem 
pipeline telah dipilih sebagai kajian kes yang terletak di Kertih, Malaysia dan Kutai 
Basin, Indonesia.  
 
Analisis daripada proses AHP menunjukkan pipeline gas di Kertih mempunyai risiko 
kegagalan terbesar yang berpunca daripada pengaratan dalaman pipeline tersebut dengan 
41.7% kebarangkalian dan selebihnya disebabkan oleh hakisan dalaman 19.7%, kesan 
luaran 13.8%, pengaratan luaran 10.7%, bebas span 8.1% dan kestabilan bawah pipeline 
6.7%. Kegagalan pipeline memberi kesan yang mendalam terhadap persekitaran dengan 
59.4% dan kesan lain adalah terhadap ekonomi 24.9% dan keselamatan 15%. Sebaliknya 
risiko yang terbesar antara pipeline minyak di Kutai Basin disebabkan oleh sistem operasi 
dengan 34.7% kebarangkalian dan disokong oleh faktor-faktor lain iaitu design index 
dengan 23.7%, penyelenggaraan 23.7% dan third party index 18%. Kesan terbesar adalah 
perniagaan iaitu 60%, dan kesan kedua ialah pada persekitaran dengan 20% dan kesan 
terakhir ialah pada populasi sebanyak 20%. 
 
Berdasarkan dua sistem pipeline maka pengubahsuaian bagi kebarangkalian dan kesan 
kegagalan telah dapat ditentukan. Hasil analysis menunjukan secara umum faktor 
kebarangkalian dan kesan kegagalan adalah sama di dalam pelbagai kawasan pipeline. 
Melalui pengetahuan dan pemahaman yang jelas mengenai kebarangkalian dan kesan 
kegagalan pipeline maka tahap dan kategori risiko dapat ditentukan. Daripada analisis ini 
pipeline boleh dikategorikan berdasarkan risiko dan ini membantu dalam pengutamaan 
penyelenggaraan pipeline. Pemeriksaan dan penyelenggaraan akan menjadi lebih mudah 
dirancang secara efektif dengan cara pemberian keutamaan berdasarkan risiko-risiko ini. 
Pipeline yang berisiko tinggi patut diberi perhatian dan yang berisiko rendah diletakkan di 




Kaedah AHP telah dibandingkan dengan kaedah yang ada di dalam merumuskan 
pemeriksaan pipeline, AHP menunjukkan keputusan yang lengkap dan terperinci. AHP 
juga boleh menunjukkan faktor yang sebenar yang menyebabkan kegagalan pipeline 
tersebut berdasarkan struktur risiko kegagalan pipeline dan dikategorikan dalam kategori 
risiko supaya penyelenggaraan yang lebih baik dapat ditentukan. Walaubagaimana pun, 
kaedah penyelenggaraan yang telah dirancang hanya berdasarkan pemeriksaan dan tidak 
ada perbandingan pada setiap faktor. Kaedah ini akan menyebabkan penyelenggaraan 
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Pipelines are the most economical means for conveying the fluid substances on mass 
scale to larger distances. For example, in oil and gas industry transportation of 
hydrocarbon and similar products through pipelines to overland and across the seas is the 
most economical means as compared to conveyance by truck, rail and/or tankers. There 
exists a very huge network of pipeline systems worldwide that extends more than a 
million kilometer in length, such pipelines are being used for conveying different types of 
substances that ranges from domestic water supply to some kind of hazardous fluids.  
 
The term pipe is defined as a closed conduit, usually of circular cross section as illustrated 
in figure 1.1. It can be made of any appropriate material such as steel or plastic. The term 
pipeline refers to a long line of connected segments of pipe, with pumps, valves, control 
devices, and other equipment/facilities needed for operating the system. It is intended for 













Figure 1.1. Pipeline Cross Section 
 
Where: 
A is the Outside Diameter (OD) 
B is the Wall Thickness (WT) 






Pipeline system is an interconnected system of submarine pipelines, their risers, supports, 
isolation valves, all integrated piping components, associated safety systems and the 
corrosion protection system (DNV, 2003). Pipeline network is an integrated transmission 
and distribution grid that can transport natural gas to and from fields offshore to end users 
in the power, industrial and commercial sectors.  
 
For the transport of large quantities of fluid (liquid or gas), a pipeline is undisputedly the 
most favored mode of transportation. Even for solids, at many instances the pipeline is a 
favorable option over the other modes of transportation. The advantages of pipelines are 
(Liu, 2003): 
 Economical in many circumstances 
 Low energy consumptions 
 Friendly to environment 
 Safe for humans 
 Unaffected by weather 
 High degree of automation 
 High reliability 
 Less sensitive to inflation 
 Convenience 
 Less susceptible to theft 
 Efficient land use 
 High degree of security 
 
A riser system is essentially conductor pipes connecting floaters on the surface and the 
wellheads at the seabed. There are essentially two kinds of risers, namely rigid risers and 
flexible risers. A hybrid riser is the combination of these two. As explained by Bay 
(2005) the riser system must be arranged so that the external loading is kept within 
acceptable limits with regard to: 
-    Stress and sectional forces 
-  VIV and suppression 
-  Wave fatigue 




The riser should be as short as possible in order to reduce material and installation costs, 
but it must have sufficient flexibility to allow for large excursions of the floater (Bay, 
2005). 
  
Offshore pipelines can be classified as follows (Guo et all, 2005): 
 Flow lines transporting oil and/or gas from satellite sub sea wells to sub sea 
manifolds; 
 Flow lines transporting oil and/or gas from sub sea manifolds to production facility   
platforms; 
 Infield flow lines transporting oil and/or gas between production facility platforms; 
 Export pipelines transporting oil and/or gas from production facility platforms to 
shore; 
 Flow lines transporting water or chemicals from production facility platforms, 
through sub sea injection manifolds, to injection wellheads. 
 
Oil and gas transport systems normally consist of medium to large diameter pipelines, 
with an estimated lifetime in the order of 30 to 50 years. The pipeline systems are built 
from a limited number of components or elements, each designed with a lifetime in the 
same order of magnitude as the system lifetime. Thus, the extent of maintenance and 
repair is generally low (Hroar, 2001).  
 
The design engineers need to understand the environments in which the pipeline will be 
installed and operated, before designing an offshore pipeline. Guo et all, (2005) said the 
parameters that will affect the mechanical design of the pipeline system are : 
 The water depth      
 The waves occur 
 The water currents 
 The fluids inside the pipelines 
 The operating pressure 
 The temperature 
 Sand concentration 




The pipe coating is used to protect the pipe against corrosion. There are some layer 
coatings, which are (Guo et all, 2005): 
1. A single layer coating is used when the installed pipeline is always in a static,  
2. Additional layer of coating are used for additional protection, for weight to help the 
pipeline remain laterally stable on the seabed, 
3. A multi layer coating is generally used in cased where the external environment 
tends to easily wear out the external coating. 
 
Palmer (2004) explained the properties that are considered desirable for deepwater 
pipeline coatings are: 
1. Resistance to seawater absorption 
2. Resistance to chemical in seawater 
3. Resistance to cathodic disbandment 
4. Adhesion to the pipe surface 
5. Flexibility 
6. Impact and abrasion resistance 
7. Resistance to weathering 





















The cost of pipeline construction and management is not uncommon higher than that of 
drilling and production components (Guo, et all, 2005). Optimizing pipeline development 
process has become a vitality important topic for achieving cost effective management in 
offshore and deepwater pipeline operations. Above figure 1.2 is the example use of 
offshore pipelines.  
 
Usually pipelines are operated at various ranges of temperature and pressure. Apart from 
the types of fluid to be transported and operational conditions, pipelines are also exposed 
to various environmental conditions such as underwater conditions, remote terrain, hilly 
and mountainous topography etc. by combining all these situations, always there existing 
a number of threats to the pipeline networks that may cause a major and/or minor failure 
to the system. If a pipeline system carrying hazardous substances, the failure may not 
only cause damages to the system but it can pollute the environment, which may become 
harmful for living beings. There have been a number of tragic incidences happened those 
have brought some unwanted consequences. 
 
In 1993, in Venezuela, 51 peoples were burst to death due to gas fire happened as a result 
of failure of gas pipeline (Hopkins 1994). The pipeline explosion at a Texas refinery 
killed 15 people and injured 170 in 2005 and spends $6 billion to repair and replace 
Alaskan pipelines (Isidore, 2006). The burst, leaks and damage of pipeline may be caused 
by corrosion. The damage may not appear significant but it can show a leak by corrosion 
inside stress fractures (Loth, 2004). 
 
In order to  operate the pipeline network safely and to prevent any major and/or minor 
failure to happen, it is very essential to perform pipeline inspection, monitoring and 
assessment routinely to determine whether any maintenance is needed or not. For 
assessing the need and extent of pipeline maintenance a risk based analysis is being used 
to determine the pipeline condition. Usually three approaches qualitative, semi 
quantitative and quantitative are applied to estimate the likely level of accident using risk 
based analysis (Dziubinski, 2006).  
 
The terms quantitative and qualitative are often used to distinguish the amount of 
historical failure related data analyzed in the model and the amount of mathematical 




historical frequency data is sometimes referred to as quantitative whereas a model 
employing relative scales, even if later assigned numbers, is referred to as qualitative or 
semi quantitative” (Muhlbauer, 2004).  
 
This research choose the pipeline for the case study because transportation of products by 
pipeline is a risk because there is some probability of the pipeline failing, releasing its 
contents, and causing damage in addition to the potential loss of the product itself 
(Mulhbauer, 2004) and the other reason is support by Dey (2004d) said that petroleum 
pipelines are the nervous system of oil industry, as this transports crude oil from sources 
to refineries and petroleum products from refineries to demand points. Therefore, the 
efficient operations of these pipelines determine the effectiveness of the entire business. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
Maintenance activities are to ensure that the physical assets continue to fulfill the 
intended purpose of the system.  The maintenance function is to increase the operational 
and design life, reliability and availability of the pipeline system.  The main purposes of 
maintaining the pipeline are to maintain an acceptable margin of safety for personnel and 
the environment and to maximize the availability of the pipeline system during its 
operational life and to maximize the pipeline life.  
 
Maintenance can be minimized during the detailed design phase by the selection of 
appropriate engineering concept, equipment and materials. During pipeline operations, 
review of routine inspections may result in decisions to undertake either preventative or 
corrective maintenance activities on the pipeline.  Correct method for pipeline 
maintenance is one of the major issues in this discipline because on the basis of current 
practices some operators performed improper maintenance, which may incur cost as well 
as unnecessary pause in the operation. On the other hand, in some instances much 









1.3. Objectives of Study 
 
The principal objective of this research study is to develop an appropriate method based 
on risk analysis to prioritize the maintenance planning of a pipeline network. The main 
objective is supported by three sub objectives, which are; 
i. To determine the probability and consequence of pipeline failure system with 
Analytical Hierarchy Process as one of the multicriteria decision system. 
ii. To perform the sensitivity analysis on the probability of failure and its 
corresponding consequence in order to test the priority.  
iii. To formulate the appropriate inspection and maintenance strategies for pipeline 
systems. 
 
1.4. Significance of this Research 
 
For this study, two pipeline networks are chosen as a case study, the first one is located in 
Kertih, West Malaysia and the other one is located in Kutai Basin, East Kalimantan. The 
outcome of this research may be referred by the pipeline operators for maintenance 
planning program. The existing method of pipeline maintenance in many operators still 
using traditional techniques, means that the method based on the simple observation, 
straight forward decision and with out comparing the factors. This method may cost a lot 
of million dollars wasted, therefore pipeline maintenance based on risk analysis become 
very important to achieve effective management in offshore pipeline operators.  
 
The method of this research used Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) which is one of the 
tools in multi criteria decision making system. In AHP the problem is constructed to 
hierarchy with several levels. Each level consists of factors that can be compared which 
one is the important. By comparing the factors then the priority factor involved in 
pipeline system can be known. When the factor comes into major then the maintenance 
should be concentrated well, and if the factor is minor then the maintenance could be 
reduced or the frequency could be minimized.  
 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is completed with sensitivity analysis to reanalyze the 
result of decision, whereas the existing method in the pipeline operators the decision is 




are to changes in how it was done. Sensitivity analysis can be useful in eliminating 
alternatives and providing information as to the robustness of a decision.  
 
1.5. Scope and Limitations of the Research 
 
The scope of this research is to determine the greatest risk factors that describe the 
probability of failure of pipeline network system by applying multi criteria decision 
making approach based on Analytic Hierarchy Process. Therefore the research is limited 
to the following scope: 
a. It involved 2 operators from oil and gas industry based in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
b. The information is assessed to develop the theoretical model based on Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
c. This research is focused on the application of Analytic Hierarchy Process as one of 








2.1.    Risk Factors 
Pipelines are commonly known as a safe way of transporting a certain substance, but their 
failure can be very catastrophic. A series of recent major industrial accidents have once 
again highlighted the need for better management of routine and accidental risks.  
Probability of an event that causes a loss and the potential magnitude of such loss are 
usually defined as Risk. Under this definition, risk is increased when the probability of 
the event increases or when the magnitude of the potential loss (the consequences of the 
event) increases. The most commonly accepted definition of risk is often expressed as a 
mathematical relationship : 
 
Risk =  event probability (PoF)  x event consequence (CoF) 
 
The risk of failure is calculated as the Probability of Failure (PoF) and Consequence of 
Failure (CoF) (Mulbauer, 2006b), where: 
 Probability is defined as “degree of belief” regarding the probability of an event 
occurring in a specified future period. Probability is most often expressed as a 
decimal 1.0 or a percentage  100%. Historical data, usually in the form of 
summary statistics, often partially establishes our degree of belief about future 
events. However such data is not, the only source of our probability estimates. 
 Consequence of Failure is defined for understanding and quantifying potential 
consequences from a pipeline failure and evaluated as the outcome of a failure 
based on the assumption that such a failure will occur. So, all consequence 
estimations will include some simplifications and assumptions in order to make the 
solution process manageable.  
 
Risk is often expressed in measurable quantities such as the expected frequency of 
fatalities, injuries, or economic loss (Muhlbauer, 2004). The factors that may affect 
probability and consequence should be identified in order to make decisions on whether 





2.1.1. Risk Analysis : Methods and Techniques 
 
Developing an understanding of the risk is called “risk analysis”. It provides an input to 
decisions on whether risks need to be treated in the most appropriate and cost-effective 
risk treatment strategies. Risk analysis involves consideration of the sources of risk, their 
positive and negative consequences and the probability of the occurrence of such 
consequences. Factors that affect consequences and probability can be identified. Risk is 
analyzed by combining consequences and their probability (Lawson, K. 2005). In most 
circumstances existing controls are taken into account. A preliminary analysis can be 
carried out so that similar risks are combined or low-impact risks are excluded from 
detailed study. Excluded risks should, where possible, be listed to demonstrate the 
completeness of the risk analysis (SAI, 2005). 
 
The magnitude of the consequences of an event, should it occur, and the probability of the 
event and its associated consequences, are assessed in the context of the effectiveness of 
the existing strategies and controls (Rishi, 2007). An event may have multiple 
consequences and affect different objectives. Consequences and probability are combined 
to produce a level of risk. Consequences and probability may be estimated by using 
statistical analysis and calculations. Where no reliable or relevant past data is available, 
subjective estimates may be made reflecting an individuals or groups degree of belief that 
a particular event or outcome will occur. The most pertinent information sources and 
techniques should be used when analyzing probability and consequences.  
 
Sources of information may include the following (SAI, 2005): 
  Past records. 
  Practice and relevant experience. 
  Relevant published literature. 
  Market research. 
  Results of public consultation. 
  Experiments and prototypes. 
  Economic, engineering or other models. 





Techniques include (SAI, 2005): 
 Structured interviews with experts in the area of interest; 
 Use of multi-disciplinary groups of experts; 
 Individual evaluations using questionnaires; and 
 Use of models and simulations. 
 
Risk analysis is a tool decision makers can use to prioritize as plan maintenance actions 
(Backlund and Hannu, 2002). Risk analysis may be undertaken to varying degrees of 
detail depending upon the risk, purpose of analysis, and information, data and resources 
available. Analysis may be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative or a combination 
of these, depending on the circumstances. The order of complexity and costs of these 
analyses, in ascending order, is qualitative, semi quantitative and quantitative. In practice, 
qualitative analysis is often used first to obtain a general indication of the level of risk and 
to reveal the major risk issues. Later, it may be necessary to undertake more specific or 
quantitative analysis on the major risk issues (SAI, 2005). The similar opinion to identify 
risks in terms of where they are located in a system and how serious they are, risk 
analysis is often used. The approach used is simple qualitative, qualitative and quantitave 
(Hannu and Backlund, 2002; Murthy et all, 2002).  
 
Model is a set of rules which predict the future performance of pipeline from a risk 
perspective. The goal of any risk assessment model is to quantify risks, in either a relative 
or absolute sense. But no one can definitively state where or when an accidental pipeline 
failure will occur. However more likely failure mechanisms, locations, and frequencies 
can be estimated in order to focus risk efforts. There are three general types of models 
(Muhlbauer, 2004): 
 Matrix models: it ranks pipeline risk according to probability and potential 
consequences of an event by a simple scale, such as high, medium, or low, or a 
numerical scale for example from 1 to 5. This approach may simply use expert 
opinion or a more complicated application might use quantitative information to 
rank risks. While this approach cannot consider all pertinent factors and their 
relationships, it does help to crystallize thinking by at least breaking the problem 





Figure 2.1. Example of Risk Matrix  (Mosaic, 2002). 
 
 Probabilistic model: it commonly refers to as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
and sometimes also called Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) or Numerical Risk 
Assessment (NRA). This technique is used in the nuclear, chemical, and aerospace 
industries and to some extent, in the petrochemical industry. The output of PRA is 
usually in a form whereby its output can be directly compared to other risks such as 
motor vehicle fatalities or tornado damages. However, in rare event occurrences, 
historical data present an arguable blurred view. 
 




 Indexing model: this approach numerical value (score) is assigned to important 
conditions and activities on the pipeline system that contributes to the risk picture. 
Weightings are assigned to each risk variable. The relative weight reflects the 
importance of item in risk assessment and is based on statistic if any, and on 
engineering judgment where data are not available. Each pipeline section is scored 
based on all of its attributes. The various pipe segments may then be ranked 
according to their relative risk scores in order to prioritize repairs, inspections, and 
other risk mitigating efforts. 
 
Figure 2.3. Example of Indexing Model (ACT, 2008) 
 
Scoring or ranking of risk assessments for pipeline types has served the pipeline industry 
well for many years in many ways. The new roles of risk assessments have prompted 
some changes to the way risk algorithms are being designed. The changes lead to more 
robust risk results that better reflect reality and fortunately are readily obtained from data 
used in previous assessments. Scoring systems as a means of analysis have been around 
for a long time. When knowledge is incomplete and a decision structure is needed to 
simultaneously consider many factors, scoring system often appears. Many risk 
assessments are based on such scoring systems.  
 
Scoring systems often use a simple summation of numbers assigned to conditions and 
activities that are expected to influence risks. Whenever conditions with more increasing 
risk are present with fewer risk reducing activities, risk is relatively higher. As risky 




(Cabeza et all, 2007). In the pipeline industry, relative risk scoring or ranking systems 
have been around for decades (Mulhbauer, 2006a). 
 
Figure 2.4. Example of Scoring (Clear, 2008) 
 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) by Saaty provides an adequate tool for multi criteria 
decision making which quantitatively supports the evaluation of best alternative with 
regard to quantitative and qualitative criteria (Saaty, 1988). It considers human judgment, 
experience, perception and feelings in the decision making process (Manoharan, 2005). 
 
Risks are by nature subjective, so to analyze their potential contribution to a failure, the 
AHP developed by Saaty is used here. This technique allows subjective and objective 
factors to be considered in risk analysis and also provides a flexible and easily 
understandable able way to analyze subjective risk factors. It is a multiple criteria 
decision-making technique that permits active participation of those involved, and 
provides managers a rational basis to make decisions. (Dey, 2001) 
 
 AHP has been applied by researchers in various industrial applications. In operation 
management, Partovi et al. (1990) has applied AHP in making decision. Korpela and 




shows how AHP helps compare process performance of various organizations under 
study to improve the performance. Reynolds (1997) has shown that risk based inspection 
and maintenance is a systematic way to integrate both probability and consequence of risk 
in inspection and maintenance decision making. Mian and Christine (1999) used AHP for 
evaluation and selection of a private sector project.  
 
Bhattacharya and Dey (2003) applied AHP in power sector for selecting power market 
structure. They argue that selection of power market structure depends on various factors 
like technical, socio-economic, and financial and moreover utility of various interest 
groups (stakeholders) affect the decision. Dey (2004a) used AHP framework for 
managing various technology management issues in oil pipelines industry. (Dey et al., 
2004b) demonstrated applications of AHP in managing operational risk of oil and gas 
pipelines in India.  
 
Khalil, et al., in 2005 presented a rational and systematic method for maintenance 
management of the pipelines. It was a risk based approach using an analytical hierarchy 
process model to determine the probability of pipeline failure and the expected value 
approach to determine the expected costs of failure. The author demonstrated applications 
of AHP in prioritizing the maintenance of pipelines based on risk analysis in Malaysia 
and Indonesia. To author’s knowledge this study is the first application of AHP for 
pipeline maintenance in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
 2.1.2. Risk Matrix 
Risk matrix is a two-dimensional array; an array made of rows and columns. In risk 
management the risk matrix is a mean to visualize these two dimensions in order to 
display the ranking of a risk. It is made of the consequence of a risk when occurring and 
the likelihood of a risk to occur (SAI, 2005). 
The number of columns and rows in a risk matrix can be different depending on how 
much refined the risk assessment shall be. Very common are 5x5 or 9x9 risk matrices 
(Cabeza et all, 2007). Construction of a risk matrix starts by first establishing how the 
matrix is intended to be used. Some typical uses for risk ranking are process hazard 




A key initial decision that has to be made is to define the risk acceptability or tolerability 
criteria for the organization using the matrix. Without adequate consideration of risk 
tolerability, a risk matrix can be developed that implies a level of risk tolerability much 
higher than the organization actually desires. Another key aspect of risk matrix design is 
having the capability to evaluate the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. The risk 
matrix should always allow the risk ranking for a scenario to move to a risk tolerable 
level after implementation of mitigating measures. Otherwise it may be difficult to 
determine the effectiveness of mitigation measures. 
2.2. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is an approach to decision making that involves 
structuring multiple choice criteria into a hierarchy, assessing the relative importance of 
these criteria, comparing alternatives for each criterion, and determining an overall 
ranking of the alternatives (Knott, 2006). By organizing and assessing alternatives against 
a hierarchy of multifaceted objectives, AHP provides a proven, effective means to deal 
with complex decision making. Indeed, AHP allows a better, easier, and more efficient 
identification of selection criteria, their weighting and analysis. AHP is very useful when 
the decision-making process is complex, for instance, by being unstructured. Indeed, 
when the decision cycle involves a variety of multiple criteria in which rating is based on 
a multiple-value choice, AHP splits the overall problem to solve into so many evaluations 
of lesser importance, while keeping at the same time their part in the global decision 
(Tanino et al., 2003).  
 
The similar opinions indicate that AHP is appropriate for the task of selecting 
components when several criteria must be considered (Cangussu, et al., 2006).  AHP 
provides a framework to view the problems in an organized but complex framework that 
allows for interaction and interdependence among factors and still enables the decision 
maker to think about them in a simple way (Pandejpong, 2002). The general concept of 
AHP is about decomposing a problem into sub problems and then aggregating the 







There are four principles in AHP method as problem solving, (Saaty, 2003);  
 Decomposing 
The goal is to structure the problem into humanly manageable sub problems.  To do 
so, iterating from top (the more general) to bottom (the more specific), split the 
problem, which is unstructured at this step, into sub-modules that will become sub-
hierarchies. Navigating through the hierarchy from top to bottom, the AHP structure 
comprises goals (systematic branches and nodes), criteria (evaluation parameters) 
and alternative ratings (measuring the adequacy of the solution for the criterion).   
Each branch is then further divided into an appropriate level of detail. At the end, 
the iteration process transforms the unstructured problem into a manageable 
problem organized both vertically and horizontally under the form of a hierarchy of 
weighted criteria. By increasing the number of criteria, the importance of each 
criterion is thus diluted, which is compensated by assigning a weight to each 
criterion.  
 Weighing 
 Assign a relative weight to each criterion, based on its importance within the node 
to which it belongs. The sum of all the criteria belonging to a common direct parent 
criterion in the same hierarchy level must be equal to 100% or 1. A global priority is 
computed that quantifies the relative importance of a criterion within the overall 
decision model. 
 Evaluating 
 Score alternatives and compare each one to others. Using AHP, a relative score for 
each alternative is assigned to each leaf within the hierarchy, then to the branch the 
leaf belongs to, and so on, up to the top of the hierarchy, where an overall score is 
computed.  
 Selecting 
 Compare alternatives and select the one that best fits the requirements.  
 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a basic approach to decision making. It is 
designed to cope with both the rational and the intuitive to select the best from a number 
of alternatives evaluated with respect to several criteria. In this process, the decision 




overall priorities for ranking the alternatives. The AHP both allows for inconsistency in 
the judgments and provides a means to improve consistency. (Dey, 2004a). 
 
In the pair wise comparison method, criteria and alternatives are presented in pairs of one 
or more referees (e.g., experts or decision-makers). It is necessary to evaluate individual 
alternatives, determining weights for the criteria, constructing the overall rating of the 
alternatives and identifying the best one (Dey, 2004b). Similar opinion to Dey, by using 
pair wise comparison method, the attributes of the various alternatives and computation 
of the unified index value of a system can be determined (Lee et all, 2006).  
 
Table 2.1 shows the scale of judgments and their definitions. After scales of judgment 
have been identified for all levels of hierarchy, matrices are constructed for each level 
starting from the top of the hierarchy. 
 







Two elements contribute equally to the 
property. 
3 
Moderate importance of 
one over another 
Experience and judgment slightly favor 
one element over another. 
5 
Essential or strong 
importance 
Experience and judgment slightly 
strongly favor one element over the 
another 
7 Very strong importance 
An element is strongly favorable and its 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Extreme importance 
The evidence of favoring one element 
over another is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation. 
2, 4, 6, 8 
Intermediate values 
between two adjacent 
judgments 







2.2.1. Mathematical Model in Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 
The basic tool in Analytic Hierarchy Process is a matrix number, representing the 
judgments of pair wise comparisons. Consider the elements C1, C2, .....,Cn of some level 
in a hierarchy. Weights of influence w1, w2, ...wn on some element in the next level. 
Denote aij as the number indicating the strength of Ci, when compared to Cj. The matrix 
of these number aij is denoted A, or A = ( aij). aji = 1/aij, that is the matrix A is 
reciprocal. If judgments is perfect in all comparison, then aik = aij . ajk for all i, j, k and 
the matrix A is called consistent, Saaty (1988). 
 
Then the mathematic formulation is : aij = wi/wj     ; i,j = 1,2,…n              (1)       
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Which is equivalent to Aw = n w                           (2) 






In matrix theory, the above formula expresses the fact that w is an eigenvector of A with 
eigenvalue n. The aij are not based on exact measurements, but on subjective judgments. 

















































































































hold. But, there are two matrix theory, the first of is, if n ,...,1  are the numbers satisfying 








           
Therefore, if Eq.2 holds, then all eigenvalues are zero, except one, which is n. Clearly 
then in the consistent case, n is the largest eigenvalue of A. Second is if one changes the 
entries aij of a positive reciprocal matrix A by small amounts, then the eigenvalues 
change by small amounts. It will result the diagonal of a matrix A consisting of ones (aii 
= 1), and if A is consistent, then small variations of the aij keep the largest eigenvalue, 
max close to n, and the remaining eigenvalues get close to zero.  
 
Then, if A is the matrix of pairwie comparison values, in order to find the priority vector, 
so the vector w is: wAw max . Since it is desirable to have a normalized solution, alter 








1. Since small changes in aij imply a small change in max   , the deviation of the 
latter from n is a measure of consistency. Then, the consistency index, as indicator of 







nCI                                                                                                          (3) 
Saaty suggests that a consistency index less or equal to 0.10 indicates that the decision 
maker has adequately structured the problem in question, but (Apostolou and Hassell, 
1993) if the consistency index is greater than 0.10 then the response by subject can be 
considered as random. Saaty proposes the following index for measuring consistency :   
RI
CICR                  (4)       
where ‘RI’ is the average value of ‘CI’ for a random matrices using the Saaty’s scale 
(Saaty, 1988). CR is a  normalized  value,  because it is divided by an arithmetic means of 
a  random  matrices consistency indexes (RI). 
 
Table 2.2. Random Index for A Several Matrix Dimensions (Saaty, 1988). 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 





Perfect consistency is hard to achieve especially when considering multiple conflicting 
criteria, but AHP provides a mechanism of measuring the consistency of the decision 
made, and allows for revisions of the decision in order to reach an acceptable level of 
consistency. AHP measures the consistency of judgment by means of consistency ratio 
(CR). A good decision is when the value of consistency ratio is 10% or less. If the value 
exceeds 10%, it means that the judgment may somehow be random and should be revised. 
 
The reasons this research uses AHP because it allows one to organize data, thoughts, and 
the intuition on a decision in a logical, hierarchical structure as outlined below : 
 The ability of AHP to incorporate both objective and subjective (Dey, 2004c). 
 It helps decision-making by quantifying many subjective factors. 
 Qualitative judgment and quantitative data can be included in the priority setting 
process. 
 The goal is broken down into sub factors of failure causes 
 AHP is an effective tool for conducting group planning sessions in an analytical and 
systematic manner. 
 AHP provides sensitivity analysis to show its effects when judgement are changed. 
 
2.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Once the analysis has been completed, the factors of risk should be analyzed for 
unexpected case. This is usually done through a set of “what if” calculations that tests the 
risk factors sensitivity. Because risk is uncertain and the analysis results may vary from 
the actual condition, it is often useful to perform a sensitivity analysis.  
 
Sensitivity analysis is a procedure used to describe analytically the effects of uncertainty 
on one parameter or more involved in the analysis of a risk failure of the pipeline 
(McAllister, 2005).  
 
Sensitivity analysis may investigate how sensitive the rankings of the alternatives are to 
changes in the importance of the criteria. Sensitivity analysis from the Goal node will 
show the sensitivity of the alternatives with respect to the criteria below the goal. Expert 




to each criterion could affect the outcomes of the model (Abdullah, 2003).  There are five 
modes for graphical sensitivity analysis: 
 
 Performance :  
The criteria are represented by vertical bars, and the alternatives are displayed as 
horizontal line graphs. The intersection of the alternative line graphs with the 
vertical criterion lines shows priority of alternative for a given criterion. 
 Dynamic :  
The dynamic sensitivity analysis is a horizontal bar graph able to increase or 
decrease priority of any criterion and sees the change in priorities of the alternatives.  
 Gradient : 
The gradient sensitivity analysis assigns each criterion a separate gradient graph. 
The vertical line represents current priority of the selected criterion. The slanted 
lines represent the alternatives. The current priority of an alternative is where the 
alternative line intersects the vertical criterion line. 
 Two-dimensional 
The two-dimensional plot sensitivity shows how well the alternatives perform in 
respect to any two criteria. 
 Difference graph: The difference graph shows the differences between priorities of 
the two alternatives taken at a time for all of the criteria. 
 
2.2.3. Expert Choice Professional Software  
 
Expert Choice represents a significant contribution to the decision making process.  It 
assists a decision maker in solving complex problems involving many criteria and several 
courses of action.  An Expert Choice solution to a problem reflects the expertise of the 
decision maker, not the computer.  Behavioral scientists have spent many years studying  
human mind and how it makes decisions. They have found that humans are influenced by 
their previous experiences and this causes them to have biases.  Basic instincts, 
preferences and environmental factors also play key roles in how we analyze data and 
make decisions.  There is no way to remove these factors from human decision making, 




more complex, it is necessary for us to employ a framework to help make more logical 
and less biased decisions while still taking our feelings and intuition into consideration. 
 
Expert Choice is based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a methodology for 
decision making.  It provides users with the tools to construct decision frameworks from 
both routine and non-routine problems and ways to include value judgments in these 
decision frameworks.  This framework is a hierarchy, used to organize all the relevant 
factors to solve a problem in a logical and systematic way, from the goal to the criteria to 
the sub criteria and so on down to the alternatives of a decision.  The user must define the 
problem and enter all the relevant issues into the hierarchy. 
 
The decision maker then provides judgments on the elements in the hierarchy in pairs as 
to their relative importance.  After the decision maker sorts the elements into hierarchy 
levels clustered into similar or homogeneous entities, Expert Choice asks the user how 
much more important, or preferred, X is compared to Y with respect to some property.  A 
judgment is made using the AHP verbal or graphical scale or the equivalent 1 to 9 
numerical scale. The process is also extended to dissimilar or non-homogeneous entities.   
Expert Choice determines if the comparisons are logical and consistent and if not assists 
the user to improve consistency through its "inconsistency measure". Finally, all the 
separate pair wise comparisons are synthesized to rank the alternatives overall.  Expert 
Choice does not make a choice in some mysterious way, or assume that the answer is 
hidden in the elegance of the underlying mathematics, but helps make an informed choice 
based on knowledge, experience, and preferences. 
 
2.3. Pipeline Maintenance : Strategy and Planning 
 
Applying AHP to pipeline maintenance offers a highly effective and proactive method of 
isolating areas (Nataraj, 2005). Maintenance has an important role directly related to the 
competitiveness of a given company. It concerns the industry’s most important capital 
assets and deals with manufacturing systems that are subject to deterioration and failure 
due to usage and age. Preventive maintenance is a necessary activity to restore or keep the 
function of a repairable system in a good state (Bardey, et all 2005). There is also an 




as a value adding process in today’s dynamic and competitive business environment 
(Liyange and Kumar, 2003 ; Markeset, 2003). 
 
Pipelines require regular patrol, inspection and maintenance, including internal cleaning 
and checking for signs of gas leaks. The integrity of the pipeline network and its related 
equipment is one of the industry’s top concerns. The threat of a catastrophic pipeline 
rupture, though extremely unlikely given the industry’s safety precautions, hangs over the 
head of every pipeline executive and employee. One of the most important causes of 
pipeline failures is mechanical damage. This occurs when heavy construction equipment 
dents the pipe, scrapes off its coating, gouges the metal, or otherwise deforms the pipe in 
some way.  
 
Mechanical damage is difficult to prevent and pipeline companies cannot continuously 
monitor every foot of the line over thousands of miles to keep people from digging 
anywhere near it. Many of the pipeline industry’s safety programs involve mapping and 
marking the location of pipe underground to warn people off (Busby, 1999).   Knowledge 
of the maintenance engineers who are expert in judgments can be useful in the design 
maintenance concept (Garg, 2006). 
 
2.3.1. Inspection Techniques 
 
The inspection plan needs to take into account previous inspection reports in order to 
assess the present condition of the pipeline. A majority of the inspection is usually 
performed through General Visual Inspection by using Remotely Operated Vehicles 
(Macdonald, 2007). Specific damages to the pipeline such as dent, buckle, etc, require 
Close Visual Inspection (CVI). Internal corrosion inspections are performed by utilizing 
Intelligent Pig or external Automated UT. For internal corrosion assessment the chemical 
analysis of fluid samples and examination of corrosion probes are also part of inspection. 
The routine external inspection of pipeline includes general visual inspection at a 
frequency depending upon the risk level of the pipeline. This inspection usually covers: 
a. Mechanical damage of the pipeline 
b. Coating damages 
c. Anode consumption and condition 




e. Signs of lateral and axial movement 
f. Leaks 
g. Extent of exposed sections of buried pipelines 
 
The aim of performing inspections is to maintain a level of safe operations, both related to 
accidents and costs. A normal inspection program for pipeline may include: 
 General Visual Inspection (GVI) underwater using diver or Remotely Operated 
Vehicles (ROV)  
 Close Visual Inspection (CVI) underwater using diver or Remotely Operated Vehicles 
(ROV) 
 General Visual Inspection (GVI) or Close Visual Inspection (CVI) above water 
 Cathodic Potential (CP) measurements using diver or Remotely Operated Vehicles 
(ROV) 
 Intelligent Pigging Inspection using Magnetic Flux Leakage or Ultrasonic Pig. 
As a general practice, the inspection of pipeline is usually limited to General Visual 
Inspection and Close Visual Inspection. 
 
2.3.2. Maintenance Plans 
 
Maintenance activities are to ensure the physical assets continue to fulfill the purpose of 
pipeline process for increasing the operational and design life. Pipelines maintenance is 
very expensive activities if it has to shut down the offshore pipelines (Guo, et all, 2005). 
With advanced technology, it is possible to carry out some maintenance activities without 
shutting down the pipeline. Maintenance can be minimized during the detailed design 
phase by selection of appropriate engineering concept, equipment and materials.  
 
The purposes of pipeline maintenance are: 
 To minimize inspection, maintenance and repair activities which could be 
hazardous to personnel. 
 To maximize the availability of the pipeline system during its operational life and 
to maximize the pipeline life. 





The following maintenance plans are commonly used in maintaining the offshore 
pipelines:   
Table 2.3. Maintenance Plans 
No Maintenance Plans Guo, et all. 2005 McAllister, 2005 Dey, et all. 2004 
1. Pigging √ √ √ 
2. General Visual Inspection √ √ √ 
3. Cathodic Protection √ √ √ 
4. Corrosion Inhibitor √ √ - 
5. Acoustic Leak Detector - √ √ 
 
Table 2.4. Maintenance Plans Function 
No. Maintenance Plans Function 
1. Pigging To clean the pipeline and identify pipeline defects 
2. General Visual Inspection To evaluate the condition in order to assess the 
pipeline integrity 
3. Cathodic Protection To protect a sub sea pipeline from corrosives 
4. Corrosion Inhibitor To protect and to control the a sub sea pipeline 
from corrosives 
5. Acoustic Leak Detector To identify the condition and leak of pipeline 
 
Based on the literature review regarding pipeline maintenance, the main maintenance for 
both pipeline under study Kertih and Kutai Basin that should be applied are pigging, 
general visual inspection and cathodic protection. The three types of pipeline maintenance 
of pigging, visual inspection and cathodic protection have been practiced in many 
pipeline industries. Beside those three methods as explained above, there are also other 
maintenance plans that may be applied to ensure the good operation of pipeline such as 
corrosion inhibitor and acoustic leak detection. The procedure in formulating the pipeline 




The pigging operation is carried out by using pigs inserted into the pipeline via a pig 
launcher (Braestrup et al., 2005). In this method, pipeline inspection gauge or pig is used 




In oil pipelines, pigging is utilized for removing debris, whereas in gas pipelines it is used 
for removing liquids and for meter proving (Guo, 2005).  PIGs can also specify the 
position in pipeline that may be in damaged condition and requires maintenance.  
 
Pigging has function as follows (Tiratsoo, 1992) : 
 Cleaning out deposits and debris 
 Internal inspection 
 Pipe geometry measurements 
 Separation of products 
 Gauging the internal bore 
 Location of obstructions 
 Improving flow efficiency 
 Liquids removal 
 Gas removal 
 Coating of internal bore 
 Corrosion inhibition
 
There are many configurations of pig to be chosen, but some configurations may not 
work in some of the pipelines. It is very important to compare the pipeline information to 
the pig specifications. The purposes of operational pigging are to obtain and maintain the 
efficiency of the pipeline. To clean the pipelines from internal corrosion, special pigs are 
available, such as those equipped with independent scraping wires that will go into a pit 
to break up and remove deposits preventing corrosion inhibitors from getting to the 
corroding area.  
 
2.3.2.2. General Visual Inspection 
 
General Visual Inspection is one of the types of underwater inspection (Ricci, 1991). 
General Visual Inspection may use Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV). The aim of this 
inspection is to evaluate the condition in order to assess the pipeline integrity. The ROV 
is performed by using high quality colour TV camera, cathodic potential measurement 
system, marine growth measurement device, and accurate depth sensor and performed 
under the instruction of inspection engineer. Findings are reported and documented on 








2.3.2.3.  Cathodic Protection 
 
Cathodic protection is a method by which corrosion of the parent metal is prevented. 
“The principle for cathodic protection is to provide enough current from an external 
source to overpower the natural current flow as described” by Guo, et al (2005). To signs 
the CP system that may be ineffective at areas of coating damage visual inspection should 
be done, for example to the rusting of exposed steel, disbanded corrosion coating, 
increase in coating loss compared with previous surveys. If steel of pipe is found to be 
damaged, engineering assessment should be performed to determine whether remedial 
measures are necessary. Extensive areas of coating loss should be assessed to determine 
whether these represent significant loss of stability or corrosion protection and if any 
remedial measures are required. 
 
2.3.2.4. Corrosion Inhibitor 
 
Corrosion inhibitor is similar with cathodic protection. The function of corrosion inhibitor 
is to controll the pipeline corrosion. Corrosion inhibitor is used as protective layer on the 
walls of the pipe by sticking to the metal or corrosion product layer such as iron carbonate 
or iron sulfide. 
 
2.3.2.5. Acoustic Leak Detector (ALD) 
 
The acoustic principle is based on sound wave. “Acoustic is “wavealert” monitoring 
though more correctly called a negative pressure wave detector. When a line rupture or 
leak occurs, there is a sudden drop in line pressure at the source of the problem, followed 
by the line repressurization a few milliseconds later.” (Mc Allister, 2005).  
Acoustic Leak Detector (ALD) has the following advantages, (Mc Allister, 2005): 
 Not affected by current, turbidity or visibility  
 No need to stop production 
 High sensitivity for small leak detection 
 100% reliability - never left behind a leaking pipeline 
 Rapidity 




2.4. Summary of Literature Review 
 
Transportation of products by pipeline is a risk because there are some probabilities of 
pipeline failing, releasing its contents, and causing damage (in addition to potential loss 
of the product itself). The most meaningful of risk are the key issue of probability and 
consequence. The probability expresses a degree of belief. The degree of belief is 
determined by consistent method, so that the judgments would arrive at the same 
conclusion given the same evidence. The consequence defines the outcome of a failure. 
The purpose of this study is to define the greatest risk of the pipeline network system and 
to prioritize the maintenance of pipeline with the highest risk and also to formulate 
appropriate inspection and maintenance plans.  
 
The key objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To define the probability of failure and consequence on failure on pipeline system 
by using Analytical Hierarchy Process. 
2. To perform the sensitivity analysis on probability of failure and its corresponding 
consequence in order to test the priority with the change in scenario. 
3.  Formulating the appropriate inspection and maintenance strategies for pipeline 
systems. 
 
Risk is characterized by uncertainty. Risk can be assumed as a range of outcomes and 
their probabilities, how ever there is specific value unknown within the range. Risk 
analysis is obtained by establishing probability and consequences of hazards. The 
probability of failure can be obtained under the basis of statistical information and the 
consequences can be determined as loss of property, fatalities and pollution of the 
environment. The evaluation of structural consequences may be performed based on 
engineering judgment or detailed computer modeling. By using engineering judgment the  
 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied in this research to investigate the risk 
failure of pipeline network system.   
 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) should assess all relevant damage modes, which 
are predictable and directly observeable. The AHP approaches are systematic and well 
known techniques tested in many problems.  Efficiency of AHP can be seen through the 




comparison into accurately prioritized weights on the criteria. Because the objective of 
this research is prioritizing the pipeline maintenance, AHP will create a prioritization that 
fairly and accurately reflects point of view of the decision maker in pipeline system. The 
AHP methodology has proven reliable because in the pair wise comparison, a decision 







This chapter presents a brief description of pipeline system selected for this research. The 
selected pipeline systems are Kertih and Kutai Basin pipeline. Both pipelines are selected 
because they are important, the largest and available at the main area of oil and gas 
production in the country. Kertih is an infrastructure project Phase 1 known as Peninsular 
Gas Utilisation (PGU I) or the main constructed facilities comprise the first gas 
processing plant (Thong, 2007). It is an export terminal and a 32 km main pipeline from 
the Gas Processing Plant (GPP) to the export terminal, power and industrials end users in 
the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. The Kutai Basin block covering approximately 
344.14 square kilometers is located in East Kalimantan Province, approximately one 
kilometer south of Samarinda city. The Kutai Basin is one of the largest and most 
important oil and gas producing basins in Indonesia (Koh, 2008). 
 
A step by step methodology is applied by a case study application. This research applied 
the methodology to the oil and gas pipelines; first it is applied on gas pipeline in Kertih 
and for the second it is applied on oil pipeline in Kutai Basin (refers to figure 3.1) and the 
details of  Indonesia gas industry can be seen in figure below.  
 
 






   Figure 3.2.  Indonesian Gas Industry (Soegiono, 2005) 
 
3.1.  Kertih Pipeline 
 
The pipeline system in Kertih is 26 years old, with a capacity of 250 million standard 
cubic feet per day (mmscfd) of gas transportation. The pipeline is 32 km long with an 
export terminal located at Kertih. The pipeline under this study is classified into three 
pipeline stretches. Table 3.1 shows the characteristic and data information for 3 pipelines 
designated as Pipeline 1, Pipeline 2, and Pipeline 3. 
 


















Pipeline 1 GAS 1982 5LX-60 610 14.3 581.4 48.7 131 
Pipeline 2 GAS 1982 5LX-60 762 17.1 727.1 155.7 131 
Pipeline 3 GAS 1982 5LX-60 762 17.1 727.1 14 131 
 
During the pipeline observation in Kertih, the primary and secondary data are collected. 
The primary data consists of list of several causes and the impact of pipeline failure. It is 
reviewed and discussed with the pipeline engineers to categorize the causes and impact of 
pipeline failure in pipeline system in Kertih. Eight pipeline engineers are involved in 




down into sub factors of probability and impact failure. The secondary data consists of 
history of the pipeline, characteristic of design pipeline and maintenance report. 
 
Here are the factors that may cause probability of pipeline failure, defined by associated 
mechanisms and failure mode. 
 
Table 3.2. Pipeline damage causes associated to failure modes 




 Internal corrosion due to fluid 
composition  
 Improper chemical treatment of fluid 




 External corrosion due to damaged 
coating and damaged/depletes 
anodes and defect from construction 
 Increased or abnormal 




 Internal corrosion due to fluid 
composition and flow characteristic  
 Pipeline design eg. angle and      
number of bends 
 Burst / leakage 
External 
Impact  
 Impacts from dropped objects, 
anchors, trawls, debris, fish bombing 
 Pipeline not piggable 
 Local buckling (collapse) 





 Lateral pipeline movement  Global buckling / Burst /  
leakage 
 Ovalisation due to 
overloading of pipeline 
Free span  
 
 Seabed scouring 
 Pipeline on bottom instability 
 Seabed undulations 
 Global buckling 








3.1.1. Factor Causing the Probability of Failure in Kertih Pipeline 
 
Probability of failure is degree of belief regarding the probability of an event occurring in 
a specified future period. Determining the factors causing probability of pipeline failure is 
one of the parts to identify the risk failure. 
 
3.1.1.1. Internal Corrosion 
 
Internal corrosion is a common damage cause in pipelines. The presence of corrosion and 
the rate of corrosion are difficult to predict, as there are many different products, each 
with different and sometimes varying composition, and different flow regimes. The 
internal corrosion damage cause includes a large variety of corrosion degradation 
mechanisms. In hydrocarbon pipeline systems, corrosion damage may be due to: 
 CO2 corrosion 
 Bacteria   
 H2S cracking   
 
Water must be present to support the electrochemical reactions causing corrosion. 
Temperature is another important parameter as it affects water condensation and has an 
effect on the electrochemical reactions. 
 
3.1.1.2. External Corrosion 
 
External corrosion is applicable mostly to risers in splash zone and onshore part of 
pipeline. However, this mechanism can also be important to submarine pipelines where 
anti corrosion measures, such as coating, impressed current etc, are not used, damaged or 
are ineffective. Inspections are used for: 
 Inspection of coating 
 Inspection for anode potential 
 Inspection for anode depletion 




3.1.1.3. Internal Erosion 
 
Internal erosion in pipeline can be caused by high fluid velocity containing sand particles. 
Sand is a prerequisite for erosion of the material inside a pipeline, and the velocity of the 
sand has to be above a certain level. Erosion appears in bends, at reduced diameter, 
connection of pipelines or other geometrical details. Usually erosion is not a problem if 
the velocity is less than about 3-4 meters per second. Erosion rate is proportional with the 
mass of sand in the pipeline, and large particles are more severe than smaller particles. 
The velocity is a very important parameter as the erosion rate is proportional to the power 
of 2.5 – 3.0 for the velocity. Erosion could cause 8 days shutdown (Astana, 2004). 
 
3.1.1.4. External Impact 
 
The initial assessment identifies pipelines subjected to high risk of external impact. 
Inspection cannot be used to avoid damage due to event based mechanisms such as 
external impact. If an external impact event occurs, it can either cause immediate failure 
of the pipeline or result in damage to the pipeline. The value of inspection is to identify 
any significant damage already occurred. 
 
3.1.1.5. On Bottom Stability 
 
The correctly designed pipelines for on bottom stability will only experience stability 
problems if it is subject to parameters outside the design range. Factors affecting the on 
bottom stability include: 
 Change in design conditions 
 Change in pipeline weight 
 Loss of weight coating 
 Corrosion 
 Loss of pipeline cover 
 Seabed movement 
 
Designing for on bottom stability is not normally a problem for pipelines below 150 m 




stronger wave and current action. The most difficult zone with respect to design for on 
bottom stability is the region between 0 – 50 m water depths, where combined wave and 
current effects can be large and highly non linear. In identifying the cause of the stability 
problem, it may be necessary to recheck the design. In doing so the following needs to be 
checked: 
 The correct input data in use (pipe properties, soil properties and environmental 
data) 
 The appropriate design method used (i.e. whether the method is valid for the actual 
application or sufficiently accurate) 
 Whether the design method has been used correctly 
 
Further, it is important to check if there have been any changes that could cause stability 
problems. Such changes might be: 
 Change in pipe properties (e.g. loss of pipe wall, loss of coating or excessive marine 
growth) 
 Change in environmental conditions (not likely) 
 Seabed movements 
 
3.1.1.6. Free Span 
 
Free span is a part of the pipe where the pipe has no support on the seabed. If a free span 
is too long the pipe might oscillate due to ocean currents. It could also be more exposed to 
damages from anchors or activities from the fishing industry. From the initial assessment, 
free spans exceeding a specified length or being defined as “active” in term of length are 
carried forward to the detailed assessment. Assessment of free spans can be performed to 
various degrees of complexity, usually requiring a significant amount of input, and the 
most advanced assessment requires detailed data and can be time consuming and costly. 
 Passive (stationary) Free Span 
Passive spans are assessed for fatigue based on an on set criterion. The fatigue 
check is calibrated to be a safe first pass criterion using information available easily. 
The maximum allowable free span lengths for passive spans are categorized into 3 
levels (see Table 3.3). Free spans less than a specified acceptable length are 




specified critical length are determined potential critical based on this conservative 
first pass check and should be assessed in more detail to assess its criticality. 
 
     Table 3.3. Freespan 
Span Length Action 
L < Laccepable No action, the free span is acceptable 
Laccepable  < L < Lpotential critical Wait and see, monitor the development of the span 
for the next years, and evaluate the span criticality. 
Inspection every year. 
L > Lpotential critical The span is potential critical, and more detailed 
assessment is required immediately. Inspection is 
to be determined based on outcome of the 
assessment. 
 
 Active (non stationary) Free span 
Active free spans are generally assessed in the same way as the passive free spans, 
but these free spans are characterized by the change of span length by time. The 
development of the free spans is usually very difficult to predict, and from surveys 
the span length seems to develop arbitrary. An active free span can develop due to 
erosion of the span shoulder and the span length gradually increases. As the length 
increases, the pipe will deflect more and more and finally the mid span will touch 
the bottom of the scour hole, and the span is split into two spans or more. The spans 
can completely vanish in a sort of self burial process due to movements of the soil. 
The development of active free spans should be assessed based on past inspections, 
to determine the most likely maximum length of the free spans and if the free spans 
are concentrated along some sections of the pipeline. In inspections, position and 
length of free span should be determined in a high degree of accuracy to be valuable 
for comparison between different inspection surveys. 
 
3.1.2. Impact Factors in Kertih Pipeline  
 
Impact or consequence or outcome is defined for understanding and quantifying potential 




mentioned above, it can impact to assets loss due to interruption in production. In this 
case the impact factors can be classified as follows : 
 
3.1.2.1. Economic Consequences 
 
The economic consequence concerns with repair costs and business loss due to 
interruption in production. 
 Repair Cost: the repair cost is divided into two parts, namely consequence for leak 
and consequence for burst. Also location of failure should be considered i.e. which 
is above water, splash zone or underwater. Repairs cost for one incident may cost 25 
million dollars (Huebler, 2002). 
 Business loss: related to the cost due to shutdown of the pipeline. The pipeline 
shutdown will push the gasoline prices to raise 3 to 5 cents a gallon as happened in 
Alaska (Isidore, 2006). 
 
3.1.2.2. Safety Consequences 
 
Safety consequence concerns with personnel injury or loss of life and the possible 
damage in products being transported. 
 Transported product : various types of products such as gas, well fluid, semi 
processed or dry. Pipeline gas may potentially create an explosive mix if air make 
its way into the pipes and mixed with gas. Restoration of the gas flow must be 
controlled by the specialists (Sochi, 2007). 
 Manning on Installation covers personnel injury or loss of life. In order to minimize 
risk of pipeline failure, the most instructive approach is to examine specific 
incidents and try to learn from the failure (Palmer, 2004).  
 
3.1.2.3. Environmental Consequences 
 
Environmental consequence concerns with the impact of various types of product releases 





 Pollution: The release of substance to environment has to be considered. The release 
of toxic or harmful substances may alter environment conditions such as impact to 
fish stocks and bird life (Friedrich, 2007). 
 Pipeline Size: Diameter of pipeline has to be considered. Larger diameter will 
release gases in a more prolonged time for a sustained rate. Small holes can cause 
leaks and produce dangerous clouds of gas. It can saturate the ground around the 
pipe and migrate along any conduit to other locations if gas escapes from a pipeline 
(Loth, 2004). 
 
3.2. Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
A crude oil pipeline with the length of 533 km in Kutai Basin is studied. The pipeline 
network under study is 24 years old, with total daily production 34.000 barrels of liquids 
(18.000 net). The pipeline is classified into five pipeline stretches. Nine pipeline 
engineers are involved in discussion in Kertih. The list of factors is refined into major 
factors, and broken down into sub factors of probability and impact failure. The 
secondary data consists of history of the pipeline, characteristic of pipeline design and 
maintenance report. Essential data and characteristics of five types of pipelines chosen in 
Kutai Basin is given in Table 3.4.  
 


















Pipeline 1 OIL 1984 5LX-52 203.2 12.7 177.8 0.4 100 
Pipeline 2 OIL 1984 5LX-52 152.4 10.97 130.4 0.4 100 
Pipeline 3 OIL 1984 5LX-52 101.6 8.56 84.5 0.4 100 
Pipeline 4 OIL 1984 5LX-52 203.2 12.7 177.8 0.5 100 
Pipeline 5 OIL 1984 5LX-52 101.6 8.56 84.5 0.5 100 
 
The Kutai Basin consists of six fields, onshore and offshore: Serang, Kerindingan, 
Melahin, Santan field, Attaka, and Santan terminal.   There are 17 platforms in this area in 
which some are manned and some are un-manned. Pipeline lay out of Kutai Basin 






Figure 3.3. Pipeline lay out of Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
Pipelines are assessed under the basis of threat and consequences. Factors assessed as 
threats to pipeline are design factor, third party factor, system operation, and 
maintenance.  Consequences are assessed based on the impact to business, environment 
and population. This basic of risk assessment is illustrated in Figure 3.4 below: 
 
3.2.1. Factors Causing Probability of Failure in Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
In Kutai Basin, the factors of pipeline failure are further broken into four indexes, as 






Figure 3.4. Probability of Failure in Kutai Basin 
 
3.2.1.1. Design Index 
 
Design index is the basis for pipeline design consisting of the basic requirements to 
functionality, so that the pipelines can be a medium of transport from one location to 
another. The basic requirements in design include : 
 Age 
 Offshore steel pipelines are normally designed for a life ranging from 10 to 40 
years. In this area the maximum life time of pipelines is 33 years. 
 Operating Pressure  
Operating pressure can be described as maximum operating pressure (MOP), 
maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP), maximum permissible pressure 
and design pressure. They are often used interchangeably, and they all imply an 
internal pressure level that comforts with design intent and safety considerations, 
whether the latter stem from regulatory requirements, industrial standards or 
company internal policies. 
 
3.2.1.2. Third Party Index  
 
Third party index means accidental damage occurring to the pipe as a result of activities 
of personnel not associated with the pipeline. This failure mode is also sometimes called 
outside force or external force, but those descriptions would presumably include earth 






 ROW Condition 
 Right of way condition is a measure of the recognizability and inspectability of the 
pipeline corridor. A clearly marked, easily recognized ROW reduces the 
susceptibility of third party intrusions and aids in leak detection. 
 Patrol Frequency 
 Patrolling the pipeline is a proven effective method of reducing third-party 
intrusions. The frequency and effectiveness of the patrol should be considered in 
assessing the patrol value. Patrolling becomes more necessary where third-party 
activities are largely unreported.   
 Above Pipeline Activity 
Above pipeline activity includes in the third party damage potential because the area 
of opportunity is strongly affected by the level of activity near the pipeline. More 
people in a pipeline area means more activities of fence building, gardening, water 
well construction, ditch digging, etc.   
 
3.2.1.3. System Operation  
 
The system operation concerns with the pipeline condition including cathodic protection, 
coating condition, metal loss defect, fluid properties and internal corrosion. 
 Cathodic Protection 
 Corrosion is another serious problem plaguing the industry. Corrosion is a sneaky 
enemy. Until it has caused obvious damage, corrosion is very difficult to detect and 
locate accurately. Metal pipe corrodes when water or other conditions in the ground 
create electrical differences between the pipe and the surrounding soil. Corrosion 
damage can take many forms, including pitting and cracking. A phenomenon called 
stress corrosion cracking is especially hard to detect and can be dangerous if left 
uncorrected. To minimize corrosion, pipeline companies install electrical devices 
called cathodic protection systems, which inhibit electrochemical reactions between 
the pipe and surrounding materials.  
 Coating Condition 
 Coating means to isolate the metal from the offending environment, it includes 
paint, tape wraps, waxes, asphalts and other specially designed coatings. Typical 




loadings (stacking of coated pipes, for instances), disbandment, softening or flowing 
and general deterioration (for example ultraviolet degradation). 
 Metal Loss Defect 
 Coupon (metal samples) can measure a corrosion rate placed near the pipe wall. 
From these measurements, actual corrosion on a pipeline can be inferred at least for 
the portions close to the measuring devices. 
 Fluid Properties 
 Properties of the transported fluid according to hazard potential are as defined 
bellow (DNV, 2003). 
 
Table 3.5. Properties of Fluids 
Properties of Fluids 
Category Description 
A Typical non flammable water based fluids 
B Flammable and/or toxic substances which are liquids at ambient 
temperature and atmospheric pressure conditions for example methanol 
C Non flammable substances which are non toxic gases at ambient 
temperature and atmospheric pressure conditions, for example nitrogen, 
carbon dioxide, argon and air. 
D Non toxic, single phase natural gas 
         E Flammable and or toxic fluids which are gasses at ambient temperature 
and atmospheric pressure conditions and which are conveyed as gases 
and or liquids. 
 
 Internal Corrosion 
 Internal corrosion in pipelines is influenced by temperature, CO2, H2S, water 
chemistry, flow velocity and surface condition of the steel. A small change in one of 
these parameters can change corrosion rate considerably, due to changes in the 










Improper maintenance is a type of error that can occur at several levels in the operation. 
Lack of management attention to maintenance, incorrect maintenance requirements or 
procedures, and mistakes made during the actual maintenance activities are all errors that 
may directly or indirectly lead to pipeline failure. 
 Pigging is chosen for the pipeline maintenance because pigging can clear 
construction of debris, remove rust, dirt and mill scale adds corrosion inhibitor. 
 Debris may cause damage to the pipeline or external corrosion protection system. 
Small amounts of debris can be tolerated, but it is important to keep the construction 
free of debris. Debris can cause damage to the operation of the pipeline by blocking 
downstream filters, damaging pump impellers, jamming valves open. 
 Corrosion Inhibitor is used to control corrosion, primarily in up stream pipelines 
carrying oil and gas from the wells to the processing plants.  
 
3.2.2. Impact Factors in Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
The impact factors concern with the damage that may affect business, environment and 
population. The impacts of pipeline failure are determined by the following factors: 
 
3.2.2.1. Impact to Business   
 
Impact to business here covers sales line, redundancy line, oil flow and volume of the 
pipeline.  
 Sales Line here means type of line, whether flow line or export line. Flow line 
means transporting oil or gas from satellite sub sea wells to sub sea manifolds and 
production facility platforms. Export pipeline means transporting oil or gas from 
production facility platform to beach for further processing. The damage of export 
pipeline may cause millions of dollars to retrieve (Frans et all., 2004). 
 Redundancy Line whether the pipeline has back up line or not such as storage 
facilities. It may cause the shutdown of pipeline for two days and the project cost to 





 Oil Flow is one of the important parts of the production profiles. Any disturbance to 
this profile will make huge impact to business aspect. Consistency of these oil flow 
line needs to be maintained. Any errors on this line will cause financial loss due to 
shutdown the pipeline. As in Brazil, the oil flow was uncontrolled due to human and 
mechanical errors and it cost $ 100 million for recovery (U.S. Chemical, 2002). 
 Volume refers to the volume of pipe or the pipeline capacity. High capacity pipeline 
may have considerable market power by requiring a minimum batch size. As 
examples for 30” diameter crude line TransCanada pipeline cost of $1.7 billion. 
Mardi Gas Pipeline construct 16” and 28” diameter segments cost $1 billion (Hull, 
2005). 
 
3.2.2.2. Impact to Environment : Property Damage 
 
The impact to environment will be considered upon the possibility of property damage 
around pipeline area, such as degradation of landscape, sediment dispersion, and 
degradation of corrosion protection. This activity must be taken seriously because it lies 
down general obligation of the states to notify and consult a significant adverse 
environmental impact across boundaries (UNECE, 1999). 
 
3.2.2.3. Impact to Population : Population Class 
 
Impact to the population class around pipelines will be higher if levels of activities of the 
people also become higher. As defined by Department of Transportation (DOT, 2008): 
1. A Class 1 population is an offshore area. 
2. A Class 2 population is low activity level or location unit that has more than 10 but 
fewer than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy.  
3. A Class 3 population is medium activity level or location unit that has 46 or more 
buildings intended for human occupancy. 
4. A Class 4 population is high activity level or location unit where buildings with four 





3.3. Moderation of Pipeline Risk Failure in Indonesia & Malaysia 
 
The pipeline risk failures commonly have similar causes and impact in every pipeline 
area. Eventhough sometimes the term is different, usually the definition is similar. 
Regarding the risk failure from pipeline industries as explained above, it can be put into 
moderation as follows: 
a. Probability of  Failure 
b. Consequence of Failure 
 
Table 3.6. Moderation of Probability of Failure 
Pipeline Area Years Researchers Factor Sub Factors 
Indonesia & 
Malaysia 
  2008 Silvianita, et 
all. 
1. Internal  
Corrosion 
1.1. Fluid Composition  
1.2. Improper Chemical 
2. External 
    Corrosion 
2.1. Damage Coating 
2.2. Damage Anodes 
2.3. Metal Loss  Defect 
3. Internal Erosion 3.1. Flow Characteristic 3.2. Operating Pressure 
4. External Impacts 
4.1. Impact from Dropped     
Objects  
4.2. Fish Bombing 
5. On Bottom   
Stability 
5.1. Seabed Movement 
5.2. Loss of Weight Coating 
6. Free span 
6.1. Seabed Scouring 
6.2. Pipeline On Bottom 
Instability 
6.3. Seabed    Undulations 
 
Table 3.7. Moderation of Consequence of Failure 
Pipeline Area Years Researchers Factor Sub Factors 
Indonesia & 
Malaysia 
  2008 Silvianita, et 
all. 
1. Economic 1.1. Repair Cost  
1.2. Business Loss 
2. Safety 
2.1. Loss of Life 
2.2. Loss of Properties 
2.3. Metal Loss  Defect 
3. Environment 3.1. Pollution 








The failure characteristics of various pipeline areas have also been studied by some 
researchers from India, Thailand and Saudi Arabia. Here is the failure characteristic: 
 
Table 3.8. Failure Characteristic of Various Pipeline Areas 
Pipeline 
Area Years Researchers Factor Sub Factors 
India    2003 Dey 1. Corrosion 1.1. External Corrosion 1.2. Internal Corrosion 
2. External 
Interference 
2.1. Third Party Activities 
2.2. Pilferage 
3. Construction and      
Materials Defect 
3.1. Construction Defect 
3.2. Poor Materials 
4. Natural Hazards 4.1. Earthquake 4.2. Floods 
5. Others 5.1. Human Error 5.2. Operational Error 
Thailand 2004 Dey, 
Ogunlana and 
Naksuksakul 
1. Corrosion 1.1. External Corrosion 1.2. Internal Corrosion 
2. External 
Influence 
2.1. Third Party Activities 
2.2. Free span 
3. Construction and 
Materials Defect 
3.1. Poor Construction  
3.2. Low Grade Material 
4.  Error 4.1. Human Error 4.2. Operational Error 
5. Other Natural Hazard 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2005 Khalil, Assaf 
and Anazi 1. Corrosion 
1.1. External Corrosion 





3. Structural Defect 3.1. Construction Defect 3.2. Materials Defect 
4. Mid wall Defect 4.1. Stress Corrosion Cracking 4.2. Hydrogen induced Cracking 
5. Operational 
Problems 
5.1. Human Error 
5.2. Operational Error 
6. Loss of Ground - 















Table 3.9. Consequence of Pipeline of Various Pipeline Areas 
Pipeline 
Area Years Researchers Factor Sub Factors 
Thailand 2004 Dey, 
Ogunlana and 
Naksuksakul 1. Economic Loss 
1.1. Total Amount of Reserve  
1.2. Operation/flow rate 
1.3. Possible product loss 
1.4. Function 
1.5. Other 
2. Environment and 
Social Effects 
2.1. Severity to Ecology 
2.2. Severity to People 
2.3. Quantity of Leak 
2.4. Affected Area 
Texas 2006 Isidore 1.  Economic Loss 1.1. Repair and Replace Pipeline 1.2. Product Loss 
2. Safety 2.1. Loss of Life 2.2. People Injured 
 
 
From both Table 3.8 and 3.9 it can be summarized than the risks of pipeline failure 
gathering from both pipeline industry in Indonesia and Malaysia have been consistent 
from the literature review. The other researchers have determined the probability of 
pipeline failure in Thailand, India and Saudi Arabia. Generally the probability factors of 
failure are similar eventhough sometimes stated in different term. The moderation factors 
of probability of failure are corrosion, external impacts, defect construction, natural 
hazards and others. Corrosion always becomes major factor that causes probability of 
pipeline failure in various pipeline areas.  
 
The pipeline failure would bring impact or consequence due to interruption in production. 
Impact of pipeline failure is magnitude of potential loss or consequence of an event. The 
consequence of failure always involves three factors namely economy impact, 
environment impact and safety impact. The highest factor of consequence of failure 
always involves the economic loss, whether for repair and replacement costs of pipeline   









Research methodology is usually defined as a process of investigation that leads to obtain 
reliable results. In general these are three categories of a research methodology for 
example qualitative, quantitative and triangulation. For the purpose of achieving the 
objectives of this research study that is aimed on knowledge acquisition, therefore a 
quantitative approach is adopted that involved the main process of sample survey with the 
help of questionnaires and interviews from experienced pipeline engineers associated 
with the selected sites.  
 
4.2. Methodological Approach 
 
Probabilities of pipeline system failure are determined by the construction of Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). The AHP model consists of various hierarchical levels. The 
first level referred to the goal, which is the determination of the probabilities of failure, 
where as the lowest level is the formulation of inspection and maintenance plans for 
pipeline system under consideration. The intermediate levels are the components those 
are related to the causes of failure and hence influence the determination of the goal. 
 
For this study a member of factors that could cause the causes of failure for the two 
pipelines systems ie the Kertih West Malaysia network and the Kutai Basin, Indonesia are 
obtained by filling in the survey questionnaire and interviewing the senior pipeline 
engineers associated with the selected sites. The factors are categorized as major factors 
and each of the major factors is further categorized as sub factors. According to AHP that 
the elements of each level of the hierarchy are required to be compared in pairs, which is 








4.2.1. Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 
For the development of an AHP model these are three basic activities, which are: 
i. The first activity involved the construction of hierarchy. In order to develop 
hierarchies, it is essentials the essential relevant details must be included. 
ii. The second activity involved evaluation of hierarchy that is built as activity, for this 
purpose Expert Choice software is used. This comparison is intended to determine 
how much various elements are related to each other and to what extent the 
particular level influences the elements of the next higher level, therefore, it can be 
used to calculate the relative strength of the impact of the element in the lower level 
on the overall hierarchy. 


























4.3.  Flowchart Applying to the Pipeline Calculation  
  
The overall process is illustrated in Figure 4.1 in the form of flowchart. 
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Here are the steps of applying Analytic Hierarchy Process; 
a.      Construction of Hierarchy 
Construction of hierarchy in AHP is starting with system identification and 
hierarchical structure. Here are the definitions of each step;   
1. System Identification  
The first step to applying AHP is by identification the system. In this framework 
the information is gathered to develop the hierarchy. The information may 
consist of primary data and secondary data of the system under study. The 
primary data  is involved the decision maker to make the judgments. And the 
secondary data can be the history, report of the system under study. 
2. Hierarchical Structure 
Based on the system identification, the information can be constructing to a 
hierarchy. The hierarchy of AHP usually involved four levels; 
i. First level is the goal that need to be achieved 
ii. Second level is the criteria of the factor to enable the goal to be achieved 
iii. Third level is the sub factor of the factor in the previous level 
iv. Fourth level is the alternatives of the pipeline under study. 
 
b. Hierarchy Evaluation 
Hierarchy evaluations consists with calculation of matrix pair wise comparison, 
priority vector completed with the consistency ratio then investigate the result with 
the sensitivity analysis. Here are the definitions for each step; 
1. Matrix Pair Wise Comparison 
The judgments of the relative importance of the elements with respect to the 
overall goal of prioritizing the pipeline maintenance are made. The judgment is 
made on numerical scale ranging from 1 to 9 (Table 2.1.). Elements at each 
level of hierarchy are compared with each other in pairs with their respective 
parents in the next higher level. For example, for comparing the factors between 
internal corrosion and external corrosion, a judgment level is chosen as 4 which 
means that the internal corrosion is 4 times (moderately to strongly) more 
important than the external corrosion. The same procedure is repeated for both 






For both factors below, which one do you think has higher probability of pipeline failure? 
      absolute                 equivalent              absolute 
I.Corrosion 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 E.Corrosion 
      
Process pair wise comparison is used for making judgments regarding the relative 
importance of the elements in each level with respect to the higher level of the hierarchy, 
using the AHP pair wise comparison scale, as given in table 4.1. below: 
 
Table 4.1. Matrix Pairwise Comparison Respect to Goal of Kertih Pipeline 














1 4 5 4 3 3 
External  
Corrosion 
1/4 1 1/2 1/3 3 2 
Internal 
Erosion 
1/5 2 1 3 2 3 
External 
Impacts 
¼ 3 1/3 1 2 2 
On Bottom 
Stability 
1/3 1/3 1/2 ½ 1 ½ 
Free span 1/3 1/2 1/3 ½ 2 1 
Total 2.37 10.83 7.67 9.33 13.00 11.50 
 
From the table 4.1 above an n x n matrix is a square matrix, because n is the number of 
rows and columns, in this level n is 6. An element is equally important when compared to 
itself therefore the main diagonal must be 1. The reverse comparisons produce the 
reciprocal of the basic comparison this is called a reciprocal matrix. The next step is 
normalized the matrix by dividing each value by the column sum. For example: 
 First column and first row for internal corrosion, the normalization is come from the 




 Second column and first row for external corrosion, the same way the normalizing 








 First column and second row for internal corrosion the normalizing is come from 






The same procedure of calculation is repeated for the whole factors as summarized in 
table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. Normalize Matrix Respect to Goal of Kertih Pipeline 














0.423 0.3697 0.652 
 
0.429 0.231 0.261 2.502 
External  
Corrosion 
0.106 0.092 0.065 0.036 0.231 0.174 0.642 
Internal 
Erosion 
0.085 0.185 0.130 0.321 0.154 0.261 1.146 
External 
Impacts 
   0.106 0.277 0.043 0.107 0.154 0.174 0.828 
On Bottom 
Stability 
   0.141 0.031 0.065 0.054 0.077    0.043 0.402 
Free span 0.141 0.046 0.043 0.054 0.154 0.087 0.525 
Total 6.889 
 
2. Priority Vector 
Next step is calculate the synthesis by multiplying the vectors of priority by the 
weight of the criteria, and taking the sum over all weighted priority entries 
corresponding to those in the next lower level, and so on. In table 4.2 it can obtain   
that internal corrosion is the highest with 41.7%. These are the priority vector of the 
criteria; 
 Internal Corrosion : 2.502 / 6 = 0.417 
 External Corrosion : 0.642 / 6 = 0.107 
 Internal Erosion : 1.146 / 6 = 0.191 
 External Impacts : 0.828 / 6 = 0.138 
 On Bottom Stability : 0.402/ 6 = 0.067 






3. Check Consistency Ratio 
Measuring Consistency 
The AHP provides a theory for checking the inconsistency throughout the matrix, first to 
compute wAxw  , then find the eigen vector and it will get max ; 
 
     1          4    5    4 3 3         0.417                                2.851 
    0.25      1  0.5 0.33 3 2      0.107                      0.739 
     0.2       2       1    3       2          3             x     0.191               =            1.332 
    0.25      3      0.33       1       2          2      0.138                                0.968 
    0.33    0.33   0.5  0.5      1         0.5                        0.067           0.449 




       2.851                            0.417 
       0.739                            0.107   
       1.332       :         0.191              = (6.837 ; 6.906 ; 6.974 ; 7.014 ; 6.701 ; 6.778 )  
       0.968                            0.138 
       0.449                            0.067 








After find the max = 6.685 then calculate the consistency index (CI), with n = 6. 
CI = )1/()( max  nn  
       = (6.685 – 6) / (6-1) 
         = 0.137 















Based on the calculation above, then it can be summarized the priority of each factor 
below; 
Table 4.3. Comparison of Factors With Respect To Goal of Kertih Pipeline 











Internal Corrosion 1 4 5 4 3 3 0.417 
External Corrosion 1/4 1 1/2 1/3 3 2 0.107 
Internal Erosion 1/5 2 1 3 2 3 0.191 
External Impacts ¼ 3 1/3 1 2 2 0.138 
  On Bottom Stability 1/3 1/3 1/2 ½ 1 ½ 0.067 
Free span 1/3 1/2 1/3 ½ 2 1 0.081 
Consistency Index : 0.137 
Random Index : 1.24 
Consistency Ratio : 0.11 
 
c.       Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Doing the sensitivity analysis, the highest priority is investigated to see how sensitive the 
parameter of pipeline risk failure. Based on calculation above the highest factor is internal 
corrosion, here are the sensitivity graphs from the Expert Choice software. 
   
 




Then to do the sensitivity analysis some scenarios is applied. The priority of internal 
corrosion is changed from 41.7 % became 36.7%, 31.7%, 46.4 % and 51.8% by changes 
the judgments.  
Table 4.4. Sensitivity Scenario PoF Kertih Pipeline 
Scenario 
Weight of Priority (%) Sensitivity (%) 
I. Corrosion PLN 1 PLN 2 PLN 3 PLN 1 PLN 2 PLN 3 
- 10% 31.7  22.9 32.3  44.8   3.69      1.26     2.58   
- 5% 36.7  22.5 32.1   45.4    1.84     0.63     1.29    
Original 41.7  21.7  31.7  46.6  -       -      - 
5% 46.4  21.7  31.7 46.6    1.07      0.63     1.38    
10% 51.8  21.3  31.4   47.3    2.36      1.26     3.23    
 
Here are the sensitivity graphs for internal corrosion as change scenario: 
 





Figure 4.4. Sensitivity Graphs with -10% scenario changes for Internal Corrosion 
 
 





Figure 4.6. Sensitivity Graphs with 10% scenario changes for Internal Corrosion 
 
4.4.     Hierarchical Structure 
 
Hierarchical structure is constructed based on the primary and secondary data from each 
pipeline as explained in previous sentences. Hierarchical structure is function as the initial 
of Analytic Hierarchy Process evaluation.  
 
4.4.1. Kertih Pipeline 
 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is developed to identify the probability of 
pipeline failure. The hierarchical structure of probability consist of four levels which are 
level-1 the goal, level-2 criteria (risk factors), level-3 sub-factors and level-4 alternatives, 




Level 4 :   Alternative
Probability of Failure 
Internal 
Erosion
Level 1 : Goal
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After determining the probability of pipeline failure, the next step is to determine the 
consequence of failure (CoF), which can identify the impact on a range of stakeholders 
and the assets. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) structure also developed to 
















































Figure 4.8. AHP Framework for Consequence of Failure (CoF) for Kertih Pipeline 
 
 
4.4.2. Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
A multi criteria problem is defined to find out the probability and consequence of pipeline 
failure. AHP framework for probability of failure (PoF) and the consequence of failure 

















4.5. Comparative Analysis 
 
Since this research involved both pipeline industry in Indonesia and Malaysia then the 
next analysis is comparing the factor of risk pipeline failure. By comparing both factors in 
each pipeline area then the moderation factor of risk pipeline failure can be determined. 
The risks of pipeline failure are divided into two parts; 
 
4.5.1 Comparative Analysis for Probability of Pipeline Failure 
 
Probability is degree of belief of an event that causes a loss occurring in a specified future 
period. Understanding the factors that may lead to probability of pipeline failure would be 
important to maximize the pipeline operation. 
 
Table 4.5. Summary of Probability of Pipeline Failure in Kertih and Kutai Basin 
Factor Causes the Probability of Pipeline Failure 
No Kertih Pipelines Kutai Basin Pipelines 
1. Internal Corrosion a. Fluid Composition Design Index a. Age b. Improper Chemical      Operating Pressure 
2. External Corrosion 
a. Damage Anodes 
Third Party Index 
a. ROW Condition 
b. Damage Coating b. Patrol Frequency 
c. Defect from 
Construction 
c.  Above Pipeline   
Activity 






b. Coating Condition 
b. Pipeline Design 
c. Metal Loss Defect 
d. Fluid Properties 
e. Internal Corrosion 
4. External Impacts 
a. Fish Bombing 
Maintenance 
a. Pigging 
b. Debris Removal 
b. Impact from    
Dropped Objects 
c. Corrosion  
Inhibitor 
5. On Bottom Stability 
a. Seabed Movement 
- - b. Loss of Weight 
Coating 
6. Free span 
a. Seabed Scouring 
- - 















The probabilities of pipeline failure from both pipeline systems are listed in above Table 
4.5. The factors which are lead to cause the probability of failure are gathered from the 
pipeline engineers of each area based on the history of pipeline under study. From both 
pipeline under study we can make the moderation of the factor which may cause the 
probability of pipeline failure. The reason this research study in Kertih Malaysia and 
Kutai Basin Indonesia pipelines because this is the main area of oil and gas production in 
their country. Under Peninsular Gas Utilisation (PGU 1) the main facilities constructed 
comprise the first gas processing plant at Kertih, (Thong, 2007). The Kutai Basin is one 
of the largest and most important oil and gas producing basins in Indonesia   (Koh, 2008). 
 
Kertih pipelines have six factors as causes to make the probability of pipeline failure 
which are internal corrosion, external corrosion, internal erosion, external impacts, on 
bottom stability and free span. Whereas Kutai Basin pipelines have four factors as causes 
which are design index, third party index, system operation and maintenance. On the 
other hand the factors of both pipelines systems are related even though sometimes their 
have different terms. Here is the similarity and differences between factors of two 
pipelines under study: 
1. Internal corrosion in Kertih pipeline is a factor of causes that make probability of 
failure, whereas in Kutai Basin Internal corrosion is in sub factor of system 
operation. In Kutai Basin it is mentioned corrosion inhibitor and pigging which are 
the function of this maintenance is to maintain the internal corrosion.   
2. Cathodic protection, coating condition and metal loss defect in sub factor of system 
operation in Kutai Basin pipeline are the preventive of external corrosion.  
3. Pipeline Design in sub factor of internal erosion in Kertih can be determine as age 
and operating pressure of pipeline as mentioned in Design Index of Kutai Basin. 
4. External impacts in Kertih are exactly similar with third party index in Kutai Basin. 
5. On bottom stability and free span factors is not mentioned in Kutai Basin. 
 
Based on the analysis above, then the moderation factors can be seen in figure 4.12 which 
is causes the probabilities of pipeline failure are here: 
1. Internal Corrosion 
a. Fluid Composition  




2. External Corrosion 
a. Damage Anodes 
b. Damage Coating 
c. Metal Loss Defect 
3. Internal Erosion 
a.      Flow Characteristic 
b.      Operating Pressure 
4. External Impacts 
a. Impact from Dropped Objects 
b. Fish Bombing 
5. On Bottom Stability 
a. Seabed Movement 
b. Loss of Weight Coating 
6. Free span 
a. Seabed Scouring 
b. Pipeline On Bottom Instability 












Probability of Failure 
Internal 
Erosion
Level 1 : Goal


























































































































































4.5.2. Comparative Analysis for Consequence of Pipeline Failure 
 
Consequence is the impact or the potential magnitude of the event loss of pipeline failure 
and evaluated as the outcome of a failure based on the assumption that such a failure will 
occur. Knowing the impact of pipeline failure will lead to prevent the causes of pipeline 
failure by maximize the pipeline maintenance. 
 
Table 4.6. Summary of Consequences of Pipeline Failure in Kertih and Kutai Basin 
The Consequences of Pipeline Failure 
No. Kertih Pipelines Kutai Basin Pipelines 
1. Economic :  a. Repair Cost  
Business 
a. Sales Line 
b. Redundancy 
b. Business Loss c. Oil Flow 
d. Volume 
2. Safety:  a. Product Transported Environment Property Damage   b. Manning on Installation  




























Kertih pipelines have three factors as the impacts of pipeline failure which are economic, 
safety and environmental. Similarly Kutai Basin pipelines have three factors as impacts 
which are business, environment and population. On the other hand the factors of both 
pipelines systems are related even though sometimes their have different terms. Here is 
the similarity and differences between factors of two pipelines under study: 
1. Business in Kutai Basin pipeline is an impact factor of pipeline failure, whereas in 
Kertih business is in sub factor of economic.  
2. Safety impact in Kertih has similar meaning with population class in Kutai Basin as 
explain in previous chapter that higher people activity then higher risk to the 
population class. 
3. Environment impact in Kertih and Kutai Basin is exactly similar.  
 
Based on the analysis above, then the moderation factors can be seen in Figure 4.14 
which is consequence of pipeline failure are: 
1. Economic :     3. Environment : 
a. Repair Cost        a. Pollution 
b. Business Loss        b. Oil Spill 
2. Safety 
a. Loss of Life 











                                 
 
Figure  4.14. Moderation Consequence of Failure 





Level 1 : Goal













































This research is based on case study on the two pipeline networks, operated in Kertih 
Malaysia and in Kutai Basin Indonesia. In Kertih, there are three pipelines included in 
this research, whereas five pipelines are studied in Kutai Basin. In order to develop the 
AHP model, the first activity involves setting up of goals in respect to the probability of 
failure, where various factors and sub factors are identified. For this process data are 
obtained by interviewing senior pipeline engineers in person related to the systems 
involved in this study.  
 
During interview they are required to answer questions asked in a questionnaire, a sample 
of that is given in the Chapter 4. After obtaining the data, it is evaluated and analyzed in 
order to determine the probability of failure and the respective consequences for each of 
the pipeline. In the following sections, results of data analysis using the Expert Choice 
software are presented.  
  
5.1.1. Analysis on Probability and Consequence of Failure 
 
The probability of failure refers to the chance of something happening, whether defined, 
measured or estimated objectively or subjectively. The consequence of failure refers to 
outcome or impact of an event. This research is trying to find out the probability and 
consequence of failure for two case studies as explained before. 
 
5.1.1.1. Analysis on PoF Kertih Pipeline   
 
Eight senior pipeline engineers give their judgments on three pipelines in their areas of 
responsibility, used to develop the hierarchy. First, the greatest risk factors are determined 





The pipeline engineers give their judgment about the relative importance of the elements 
in respect to the overall goal of prioritizing the pipeline maintenance, using the pair wise 
comparison scale based on the hierarchy figure 4.7. Details are given in Appendix A1.   
 
Table 5.1. AHP Output for Probability of Failure (PoF) for Kertih Pipeline 
Failure Factor 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Output on Probability of Failure 
Major 
Factor 
Probability Subfactor Probability Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 
Internal 
Corrosion 
0.417 Fluid Composition 0.278 0.039 0.093 0.147 
Improper Chemical 
Treatment of Fluid  
0.139 0.033 0.029 0.077 
External 
Corrosion 
0.107 Damage Coating 0.053 0.017 0.014 0.022 
Damage Anodes 0.033 0.005 0.007 0.021 
Defect from 
Construction  
0.021 0.003 0.005 0.012 
Internal 
Erosion 
0.191 Flow Characteristic 0.048 0.007 0.012 0.028 




0.138 Impact from 
Dropped Objects 
0.092 0.018 0.029 0.045 




      
0.067 
Seabed Movement 0.050 0.009 0.013 0.027 
Loss of Weight 
Coating 
0.017 0.008 0.005 0.003 
Free span       
0.081 
Seabed Scouring 0.044 0.007 0.013 0.024 
Pipeline On Bottom 
Instability 
0.017 0.004 0.004 0.009 
Seabed Undulations 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.011 
Probability of failure of various Pipeline 0.217 0.317 0.466 







Table 5.1 shows the AHP output for probability of failure for three pipelines at Kertih. 
Results of the pair wise comparison for the first level of the hierarchy indicate that   
internal corrosion has contributed highest probability to pipeline failure, namely 41.7%. 
The second highest probability is determined by internal erosion of 19.1%, followed by 
external impact of 13.8% and other factors at the sum of 41.7%. The second highest 
probability of the cause of pipeline failure is internal erosion of 19.1%. The third highest 
is external impact of 13.8%, and the other factors are external corrosion of 10.7%, free 
span of 8.1%, on bottom stability at the sum of 6.7%. 
 
Sub factors are the probable causes attributed to the main factors, for example 41.7% 
probability of failure due to internal corrosion is caused by 27.8% due to fluid 
composition and only 13.9% probability of failure is contributed by improper chemical 
treatment of fluid. It means that the internal corrosion occurring due to the pipe wall loss 
or damage is caused by reaction between the inside wall of pipe and the transported 
product depending on fluid composition.  
 
In order to apply chemical treatment to inner side of the pipe, it is necessary that the 
corrosion mechanism should be fully understood to avoid improper chemical treatment of 
fluid. For example, oxygen is the main agent that promotes corrosion on steel, therefore 
oxygen scavenging chemical can be combined with the oxygen in the product to prevent 
this oxygen from reacting with the pipe wall. Similarly, internal erosion is attributed by 
two sub factors i.e. flow characteristic and the pipeline design. Pipeline design usually 
dominates the failure due to internal erosion as the probability obtained in table 5.1. 
 
5.1.1.2. Analysis on CoF Failure Kertih Pipeline 
 
After determining of the probability of pipeline failure the next step is to determine the 
consequence of failure, intended to identify its impact to a range of stakeholders and the 
assets. Based on the Figure 4.8 the same analysis is applied to determine the consequence 








Table 5.2. AHP Output for Consequence of Failure (CoF) for Kertih Pipeline   
Impact Factor 
 Analytic Hierarchy Process Output    
on Consequence of Failure 
Major 
Factor 
Consequence Sub factor Consequence Pipeline 1  Pipeline 2   Pipeline 3 
 Economic 0.249  Repair Cost 0.062 0.009 0.027 0.027 
 Business 0.187 0.037 0.075 0.075 
 Safety 0.157  Product 0.118 0.011 0.026 0.041 
 Manning 0.039 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Environment 0.594 Pollution  0.297 0.042 0.127 0.127 
Pipeline Size 0.297 0.042 0.127 0.127 
Consequence of failure of various Pipeline 0.164 0.409 0.428 
Ranking  3 2 1 
 
From the analysis on consequence of failure, it is determined that the highest probability 
i.e. 59.4% will have significant impact to environment. There are two sub factors namely 
pollution and pipeline size and both of them will contribute equally with a consequence of 
29.7% respectively. As a matter of fact that pollution due to leakage or burst of a pipeline 
will have an effect to a company’s reputation as well as to the surroundings. The size of 
pipeline indicates that the production throughout the pipeline can affect the environment.  
 
Thus the pipelines can be ranked in respect to their consequence of failure. The 
probability or consequence cannot identify which pipeline should be maintained in high 
priority. The next step is to integrate them together. The sum of all weighting coefficients 
must always be 1.00, so that they can now be divided into 5 risk scores. The new score of 
each pipeline is set based on risk score as shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Risk Score 
Weight of Priority Risk Score 
0.01 - 0.20 1 
0.21 - 0.40 2 
0.41 - 0.60 3 
0.61 - 0.80 4 




Risk ranking is best illustrated in a matrix form that illustrates the probability of failure 
on one axis and the consequence on the other one. This matrix gives an estimate on risk 
calculated by multiplying risk score of probability of failure with that of the consequence. 
 
Table 5.4. Risk Value 
Category of Risk 
Range of Risk 
Value 
High Risk 21 – 25 
Medium to High Risk 16 – 20 
Medium Risk 10 – 15 
Low to Medium Risk 6 – 9 
Low Risk 1 – 5 
 
The risk category of each pipeline can be categorized using risk matrix as given in Table 
5.4. From the analysis on Kertih network it is determined that all these pipelines fall 
under low risk category. It is due to the fact that all three pipelines under this study carry 
gas, usually having high consequence, but having low probability of failure, they fall 
under low risk category.  
 
The final outcomes of each of the pipeline against the risk factors are summarized in 
Table 5.5. Both probability and consequence for each of the three pipelines are summed 
up to determine the risk level of pipeline. The weight of probability and consequence in 
Kertih pipeline changes because the risk score matrix is based on 5x5 matrixes, so to 
normalize the value, then the weight should be multiplied by 3/5. Multiplying the weight 
of probability and consequence by 3/5, the risk score is consistent within both pipeline 
industries because there are five pipelines in Kutai Basin and three pipelines in Kertih. 



















Category  Weight Rank 
  Risk Score 
(0-5) 
Weight Rank 
 Risk Score 
(0-5) 
PLN 1 0.133 3 1 0.098 3 1 0.013 3 1 Low Risk 
PLN 2 0.191 2 1 0.245 2 2 0.047 2 2 Low Risk 
PLN 3 0.276 1 2 0.257 1 2 0.071 1 4 Low Risk 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Risk Matrix for Kertih Pipeline 
 
5.1.1.3. Analysis on PoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
The pipeline systems in Kutai Basin are to transport oil, under the same procedure as 
applied in Kertih pipeline. The first analysis is to calculate the risk for pipeline failure in 
terms of probability and consequence as the hierarchy shown in Chapter 4. As previously 
discussed, the pipeline engineers gave their judgment about the relative importance of the 
elements in respect to the overall goal of prioritizing the maintenance of the pipeline, 
using the pair wise comparison scale. Details are given in Appendix B1. Table 5.6 shows  






Table 5.6. AHP Output of PoF of Kutai Basin Pipeline   
Failure Factor 
Analytic Hierarchy Process Output on 

























































Age 0.158 0.013 0.017 0.034 0.060 0.034 
Operating 
Pressure  






0.042 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Patrol 
Frequency 










0.044 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.003 
Coating 
Condition 
0.044 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Metal Loss 
Defect 
0.083 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Fluid 
Properties 
0.048 0.024 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Internal 
Corrosion 
0.129 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 
 Maintenance 0.237 
Pigging 0.079 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Debris R. 0.079 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Corrosion 
Inhibitor 
0.079 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Probability of failure of various Pipeline 0.187 0.201 0.201 0.216 0.195 





The results of the pair wise comparison for the major factor in the hierarchy indicate that 
the highest contribution to the probability of pipeline failure derives from system 
operation i.e. 34.7%. The second highest probability causing a pipeline failure is design 
index and maintenance namely 23.7% and the lowest contribution cause by the third party 
index is 18%. 
 
The results of the pair wise comparison at the sub factors level of the hierarchy show that 
the probability derives from a major factor shared by the sub factors. For example, the 
result of major factor shows that system operation contributes 34.7%  probability of 
failure that would be due to the sub factors which are cathodic protection of 4.4%, coating 
condition of 4.4%, metal loss defect of 8.3%, fluid properties of 4.8% and internal 
corrosion of 12.9%.  
 
Corrosion is defined as an electrochemical reaction that involves the loss of metal. To 
prevent corrosion on parent metal, cathodic protection is used. Corrosion is usually 
caused by electrons flowing from one point to the other in which pipeline surface consists 
of randomly distributed cathodic and anodic areas, and seawater is electrolyte that 
completes the galvanic cell. To create an electrochemical cell, metal with lower potential 
can become a cathode and is protected by connecting a metal with higher potential to the 
steel pipeline. Then the pipeline is protected against corrosion by coatings, by attaching 
anodes which are aluminium and zinc to the steel pipeline. The fluid properties containing 
CO2 and H2S will cause corrosion and affect operations of the pipeline. The last sub 
factor is internal corrosion related to fluid carried by pipeline or depending upon 
aggressiveness of the transported medium. 
 
5.1.1.4. Analysis on CoF Failure in Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
For the analysis on consequence of failure, the highest impact to business is determined at 
the sum of 60%, whereas impact to environment is calculated at the sum of 20%, and the 
impact to population is also determined 20%. Details for the pair wise comparison are 
given in Appendix B2.  Impact to business depends on the line type, whether it is a flow 
line an export line, the redundancy line or oil flow and the volume. All these factors 





 Table  5.7. AHP Output of CoF of Kutai Basin Pipeline   
Failure Factor 
Analytic Hierarchy Process Output on 





















































Business 0.600 Sales Line 0.249 0.072 0.015 0.085 0.014   0.064 
Redundancy 0.064 0.002 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.014 
Oil Flow 0.176 0.021 0.084 0.026 0.019 0.026 
Volume 0.111 0.019 0.029 0.019 0.022 0.022 
Environment 0.200 Property D  0.200 0.096 0.010 0.010 0.042 0.042 
Population 0.200  Population C 0.200 0.025 0.099 0.019 0.029 0.029 
Consequence of failure of various Pipeline 0.227 0.239 0.190 0.142 0.202 
Ranking  2 1 4 5 3 
 
Thus pipelines can be ranked in respect to their consequence of failure. The probability or 
consequence cannot identify which pipeline should be maintained in high priority. The 
next step is to integrate them together. The new score of each pipeline is set based on its 
priority. 
 
The method of risk calculation is based on multiplication the two values: risk score of 
probability and risk score of consequence. The risk category for each pipeline can be 
categorized by risk matrix (Table 5.8). It is determined that all five pipelines fall under 
the low risk category. 
 
Table 5.8. Risk Category of Kutai Basin Pipeline 
Name 
Probability Consequence 




Category Weight Rank Risk Score Weight Rank 
Risk 
Score 
PLN 1 0.189 4 1 0.227 2 2 0.043 2 2 Low Risk 
PLN 2 0.203 2 2 0.239 1 2 0.049 1 4 Low Risk 
PLN 3 0.203 2 2 0.190 4 1 0.039 4 2 Low Risk 
PLN 4 0.219 1 2 0.142 5 1 0.031 5 2 Low Risk 







Figure 5.2. Risk Matrix in Kutai Basin Pipeline 
.  
5.2. Analysis on Moderation Probability of Failure 
 
Based on the comparative analysis between the factor of probability of failure in Kertih 
and that in Kutai Basin pipeline as described Chapter 4, the next step is to analyze the risk 
category of each pipeline in new hierarchy (see Figure 4.12). 
 
From the analysis shown in Table 5.9 there are some value changes, because compare to 
Table 5.1. and Table 5.6 some of the factors are eliminated and modified by other factors. 
The internal corrosion in Kertih pipeline, the value still remains the same with the value 
in previous analysis, namely 41.7%, whereas in Kutai Basin pipeline, the internal 
corrosion changes from 12.9% to 28.7%. It is because the internal corrosion in Kutai 
Basin can be classified based on other factors namely pigging and corrosion inhibitor. 











Kutai Basin Kertih 
Probability Sub factor Probability PLN  2a 
PLN 
 2b   PLN 2c 
  PLN 
   2d 
 PLN  










  Pigging 0.079 0.016 0.016   0.016 0.016 0.016 
0.417 
Fluid Composition 0.278 0.039 0.093 0.147 
Corrosion 
Inhibitor  0.079 0.016    0.016   0.016   0.016    0.016 
Improper 
Chemical     
0.139 0.033 0.029 0.077 
 Internal               




Cathodic         
Protection 0.044 0.013   0.013   0.013   0.003  0.003 
0.086 
Damage Coating 0.053 0.017 0.014 0.022 
Coating 
Condition 0.044 0.009   0.009   0.009   0.009   0.009 
Damage Anodes 0.033 0.005 0.007 0.021 




Pressure 0.079 0.026   0.025   0.008   0.008  0.013 0.048 
Flow 







0.105 0.003 0.026   0.026   0.026   0.026 
0.138 
Impact  Dropped 
Objects 
0.092 0.018 0.029 0.045 
Patrol 
Frequency 0.033 0.002  0.008  0.008   0.008   0.008 
Fish Bombing 0.046 0.015 0.012 0.019 
On Bottom 
Stability - - - - - - - - 0.067 
Seabed 
Movement 
0.050 0.009 0.013 0.027 
Loss of Weight 
Coating 
0.017 0.008 0.005 0.003 
Free span 
- - - - - - - - 0.081 




0.017 0.004 0.004 0.009 
Seabed    
Undulations 
0.019 0.004 0.005 0.011 
Probability of Failure of Kutai Basin Pipeline 0.128  0.156  0.139 0.129 0.134 Probability of Failure of Kertih Pipeline  0.166 0.236 0.433 




Table 5.10. Moderation on Probability of Pipeline Failure 
Moderation 
Criteria 
Kutai Basin Kertih 
Consequence Factor/ Sub factor Consequence 
PLN 
2a 




  PLN 
   2d 
 PLN 
  2e Consequence 
Factor/ 








Sales Line 0.249 0.072 0.015 0.0850.014 0.064 
0.249 
Repair Cost 0.062 0.009 0.027 0.027 
Redundancy 0.064 0.002 0.018 0.015  0.015 0.014 Business 0.187 0.037 0.075 0.075 
Oil Flow 0.176 0.021 0.084 0.026  0.019 0.026 - - - - - 
Volume 0.111 0.019 0.029 0.0190.022  0.022 - - - - - 
Safety 0.200 Property D 0.200 0.096 0.010 0.0100.042 0.042 0.039 Manning 0.039 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Environment 0.200 Oil Spill 0.200 0.025 0.099 0.0190.029 0.029 0.297 Pollution 0.297 0.042 0.127 0.127 
Consequence of Failure of Kutai Basin Pipeline 0.227 0.239 0.1900.142 0.202 Consequence of Failure of Kertih Pipeline 0.114 0.255    0.255 
Ranking 2 1 4 5 3 Ranking 2 1 1 
 
Table 5.11. Moderation on Risk Category of Kertih Pipeline 
Name Probability Consequence Risk Risk Rank Risk Value Risk Category  Weight Rank  Risk Score (0-5) Weight Rank   Risk Score (0-5) 
  PLN 1a 0.099 3 1  0.068 3 1 0.007 3 1 Low Risk 
  PLN 1b 0.142 2 1  0.153 1 1 0.022 2 1 Low Risk 
  PLN 1c 0.260 1 2  0.153 1 1 0.040 1 2 Low Risk 
 
Table 5.12. Moderation on Risk Category of Kutai Basin Pipeline 
Name Probability Consequence Risk Risk Rank Risk Value Risk Category 
Weight Rank Risk Score (0-5) Weight Rank Risk Score(0-5) 
PLN 2a 0.128 5 1 0.227 2 2 0.029 2 2 Low Risk 
PLN 2b 0.156 1 1 0.239 1 2 0.037 1 4 Low Risk 
PLN 2c 0.139 2 1 0.190 4 1 0.026 4 2 Low Risk 
PLN 2d 0.129 4 1 0.142 5 1 0.018 5 2 Low Risk 
PLN 2e 0.134 3 1 0.202 3 1 0.027 3 1 Low Risk 
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Figure 5.4. Moderation on Risk Category of Kertih Pipeline 
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5.3. Analysis on Moderation Consequence of Failure 
 
It is the same analysis with moderation probability of pipeline failure. The next step is 
also moderation consequence of pipeline failure for both Kertih and Kutai Basin pipeline 
as described in Chapter 4, with new hierarchy (see Figure 4.14). 
 
From the analysis shown in Table 5.13 there are some value changes, because compare to 
Table 5.2. and 5.7 some of the factors are eliminated and modified with other factors. For 
example safety consequence, in Kutai Basin pipeline the value still remains the same with 
the value in previous analysis namely 20%, whereas in Kertih pipeline, the safety impact 
changes from 15.7% to 3.9%. The transported product factor is eliminated because of 
moderation in safety factor in Kutai Basin pipeline. Table 5.13 is the summary of 
moderation for both pipelines with new hierarchy as shown in Figure in 4.12 and 4.14. 
After identifying the risk category, the risk matrix in Figure 5.5 can be determined. 
 
Table 5.13. Summary of Moderation for Pipeline Risk Category 
 
 
The objective of risk matrix ranking is to set the inspection priority on pipeline 
maintenance. The pipeline is placed in a 5 X 5 matrix to indicate its relative risk ranking 
as compared to other pipelines. Inspection can help reduce the probability of failure 
whereas engineering changes are usually required to reduce consequence of failure. When 
reviewing pipeline inspection schedule and performing turnaround planning it is helpful 
to record the overall risk of each pipeline (see Table 5.13). 
Name 
Probability Consequence 




Category Weight Rank Risk Score Weight Rank 
Risk 
Score 
PLN 1a 0.099 3 1  0.068 3 1 0.007    3 1 Low Risk 
PLN 1b 0.142 2 1  0.153 1 1 0.022    2 1 Low Risk 
PLN 1c 0.260 1 2  0.153 1 1 0.040    1 2 Low Risk 
 PLN 2a 0.128 5 1  0.227 2 2 0.029 2 2 Low Risk 
 PLN 2b 0.156 1 1  0.239 1 2 0.037 1 4 Low Risk 
 PLN 2c 0.139 2 1  0.190 4 1 0.026 4 2 Low Risk 
 PLN 2d 0.129 4 1  0.142 5 1 0.018 5 2 Low Risk 
 PLN 2e 0.134 3 1  0.202 3 1 0.027 3 1 Low Risk 
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Figure 5.5. Summary of Moderation for Pipeline Risk Category 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of pipelines by risk in 5 X 5 risk matrix. The 
distribution is based on the weight of priority of probability of failure in X axis and 
consequence of failure in Y axis. From Figure 5.5 it can be seen that Pipeline 1c has the 
tendency towards the highest degree to pipeline risk failure.  
 
The result of analysis in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 shows that pipeline 1c, 2a and 2b have 
the highest probability of failure with 43.3%, 12.8%, 15.6% and the consequence is 
25.5%, 22.7%, 23.9% respectively. There are six factors in probability of failure namely 
internal corrosion, external corrosion, internal erosion, external impacts, on bottom 
stability and free span. Whereas in consequence of failure there are three factors i.e. 
economy, safety and environment.  
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Based on moderation of probability of pipeline failure in Table 5.9, the highest factor that 
contributes in pipeline 1c, 2a and 2b have tendency towards pipeline failure which is 
internal corrosion. For example pipeline 1c of 22.4% is contributed by fluid composition 
of 14.7% plus improper chemical of 7.7%. Internal corrosion is related to fluid being 
carried by pipeline. Internal corrosion can cause wall thinning in every pipeline system 
during its operating life. In pipeline systems, corrosion damage may due to CO2 
corrosion, bacteria and H2S cracking. 
 
In Table 5.10 moderation of consequence of pipeline failure, indicates that the highest 
factor in pipeline 1c, 2a and 2b is impact to economy. For example the economic impact 
in pipeline 1c is 10.2% contributed by repair cost of 2.7% and business value of 7.5%. 
The internal corrosion as highest factor of probability of pipeline failure will impact to 
economy depending on the repair cost of pipeline and the business loss due to interruption 
in production. Here is the estimation of economic impact in pipeline industry: 
 
Table 5.14. Leak Repair Cost 
CoF Leak Repair Cost 
Pipe Diameter Cost Duration of Repair 
> 24" US $ 100,000 30 days 
> 12" = 24" US $ 70,000 30 days 
= 12" US $ 60,000 30 days 
 
Table 5.15. Leak Repair Cost 
CoF Burst Repair Cost 
Pipe Diameter Cost Duration of Repair 
> 24" US $ 2,000,000 180 days 
> 12" = 24" US $ 1,500,000 180 days 
= 12" US $ 1,000,000 180 days 
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5.4. Existing Method Compare to Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 
The pipeline maintenance in Kutai Basin uses pipeline integrity method. This method 
consider the pipeline systems as having design features and operating characteristic, 
which are unique for each individual system. Although those pipelines are unique, the 
frameworks for developing pipeline integrity are similar. 
 
5.4.1. Existing Method in Kutai Basin Pipeline  
 
Pipeline systems have design features and operating characteristic, which are unique for 
each individual system. Here is the existing method of pipeline maintenance in Kutai 

















Figure 5.6. Frameworks of Pipeline in Kutai Basin 
 
Identifying Potential Pipeline Impact 
This framework involves the identification of pipeline that has significant impact to the 
event of failure.  Impact identification involves impact to business, environment, 
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population and areas affected within the pipeline where it lies or near the pipeline system 
corridor. 
 
Initial Data Gathering Review, and Integration 
The first step in understanding the potential integrity threats along the pipeline system is 
to assemble information about potential risks. The types of data to support a risk 
assessment include information on the operation, maintenance, and surveillance practices, 
pipeline design, operating history, and the specific failure modes and concerns that are 
unique for each pipeline.   
 
Initial Risk Assessment 
In this framework, the data assembled from the previous step is used to conduct a risk 
assessment of the pipeline system. The risk assessment begins with a systematic and 
comprehensive search for possible threats to pipeline or to facility integrity with its 
consequences to the event of failure. 
 
Developing Baseline Plan 
Based on output of the risk assessment, a plan shall be developed to address the most 
significant risks and assess the integrity of the pipeline system. The plan shall include the 
preventive and mitigate risk control actions, as well as integrity assessment activities 
(e.g., internal and external corrosion survey, inline inspection, pressure testing). 
 
Inspection and or Mitigation.  
In this frame, the baseline assessment plan activities are implemented, the results are 
evaluated, and the necessary repairs are made to assure defects that might lead to pipeline 
failure are eliminated.  
 
Updating, Integrating, and Reviewing the Data 
 The improved and updated information about condition of the pipeline information shall 
be retained and added to the database information.  The information in database will be 





Revising Inspection and Mitigation Plan 
Risk assessments should be performed periodically. New information on the pipeline 
includes recent operating data, changes in the pipeline system design and operation, 
external change that may have occurred, inspection results, etc.  
 
Revising Mitigation and Inspection Plan 
The on-going integrity and mitigation plan should be periodically updated to reflect new 
information and the current understanding of integrity threats.  As new risks or new 
manifestations of previously known risks are identified, additional preventive or mitigate 
actions to address these risks should be performed, as appropriate.  
 
Evaluating Program.  
The pipeline engineers in charge should collect performance information and periodically 
evaluate the success of its inspection and monitoring techniques, pipeline repair activities, 
and other preventive and mitigate risk control activities.   
 
Managing Change 
The last framework is managing change applicable to all individual frameworks above 
repectively.  The maintenance is not a one-time process, it is a continuous process during 
the lifetime of the pipeline, which includes monitoring pipeline condition, identifying and 
assessing risks, and taking action to minimize the most significant threats. 
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5.4.2.  Analytic Hierarchy Process Method 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Analytic Hierarchy Process Method 
 
Identifying Risk Factor 
This framework involves identification of pipeline that has significant risk on the event of 
failure.  Risk factor identification involves factors which may cause probability of 
pipeline failure and the consequence affected within the pipeline where it lies or near the 
pipeline system. 
 
Initial Data Collecting 
The first step in understanding the potential integrity threats along the pipeline system is 
to assemble information about potential risks. In this framework, we should perform the 
initial data collection, review, and integration of data needed to understand condition of 
the pipe and identify the location of the specific threats to its integrity. The types of data 
to support a risk assessment include primary and secondary data. The primary data is 
developed by using questionnaire and interviewing the pipeline engineers for the pipeline 
system. The information gathered concerns with the operation, maintenance, pipeline 
design, operating history, and the specific failure modes and those that are unique for 





In this framework, the data assembled from the previous step is used to construct a 
hierarchy of the pipeline system. The construction of hierarchy consists of four levels 
which are: 
i. First level is the goal that needs to be achieved. 
ii. Second level is the criteria of the factor to make the goal achieved. 
iii. Third level is the sub factor of the factor in the previous level. 
iv. Fourth level is the alternatives of the pipeline under study. 
In this research, the hierarchy is constructed in systematic and comprehensive ways for 
probability damage to pipeline and the impact or the consequence to pipeline failure. 
 
Evaluating Risk 
Based on the hierarchy construction, risk can be evaluated by analysis hierarchy process. 
In this analysis, the decision maker carries out matrix pair wise comparison based on the 
hierarchy. By comparing each element, the priority for each factor will be found. The 
result of priority factor must consider consistency ratio which is less than 10%. The 
function of consistency ratio is to check whether the judgments from the respondent have 
adequately structured the problem in question. The detailed calculation can be seen in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a procedure to describe analytically the effects of uncertainty on 
one parameter or more, involved in the analysis of a risk failure of the pipeline. The 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is completed with five sensitivity graphs, as follows: 
1. Performance Graphs 
2. Dynamic Graphs 
3. Gradient Graphs 
4. Two-dimensional Graphs 
5. Difference Graphs 
 
Scoring 
Scoring systems here use a summation of numbers assigned to conditions and activities 
expected to influence risks. This step consists of risk level divided into a matrix form 
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illustrating the probability of failure on one axis and the consequence on the other. This 
matrix gives an estimate on risk calculated by multiplying risk score of probability of 
failure with that of the consequence. The next step is risk categories which are low risk, 
low to medium risk, medium risk, medium to high risk and high risk category.   
 
Maintenance Plan 
Maintenance plan are to ensure that the physical assets continue to fulfill the pipeline 
process for increasing the operational, design life, availability of the pipeline system. 
Pipeline systems and the environment in which they operate are never static. Therefore 
maintenance or repair can be reduced during the detailed design phase by the selection of 
appropriate engineering concept, equipment and materials. 
 
The existing method for pipeline maintenance in Kutai Basin generally applies risk 
assessment and the inspection, whereas in AHP method it is added by comparing the risk 
factors, sensitivity analysis and risk scoring. Compared to the existing method for 
pipeline maintenance in Kutai Basin, the AHP method has additional advantages, i.e.: 
a. AHP can include both intangible and tangible elements in hierarchy 
b. The ability of AHP to incorporate both objective and subjective 
c. Possible to compare risk factors in hierarchy 
d.  The sensitivity or effect of result calculation can be analyzed by using sensitivity 
analysis  
e. Possible prioritization on pipeline maintenance based on risk category 
 
5.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The next step of analysis performed after finding the risk level is sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis is used to investigate the sensitivity of the alternatives in order to 
apply changes in the priorities of the criteria. In the application of Expert Choice software 
there is a tool that is used to determine sensitivity of the priority. There are five graphical 







The performance graph displays all the information about the criteria value on a single 
screen. The priority of each criterion is shown by rectangular box on the each criterion 
vertical line. Here are the four performance graphs for each hierarchy structures; 
    
 Figure 5.8. Performance Sensitivity Graphs for PoF of  Kertih Pipeline 
 




Figure 5.10. Performance Sensitivity Graphs for PoF of Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Performance Sensitivity Graphs for CoF of  Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
Figure 5.8 – 5.11 shows the performance of sensitivity analysis in respect to the 
alternatives prioritized in relation to the others either individual or respect to as whole. 
The criteria bars can be drag up or down which can temporarily alter the relationship 
between the alternatives and criteria. The lines for the alternatives between the vertical 





The second graph to perform sensitivity analysis is to use dynamic sensitivity. From the 
dynamic display it can be seen how the change of priority in one criterion affects 
priorities of the others. Here are the four dynamic graphs for each hierarchy: 
 
Figure 5.12. Dynamic Sensitivity Graphs for PoF Kertih Pipeline 
 
 




Figure 5.14. Dynamic Sensitivity Graphs for PoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Dynamic Sensitivity Graphs for CoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
To view the dynamic changes from priorities of the objectives, dynamic sensitivity 
analysis is performed for this study as given in Figure 5.12 – 5.15. It shows how changes 
affect priorities of the alternative. The priority criterion can be drag back and forth in the 






The third way to know sensitivity is through Gradient Sensitivity. This graph explains the 
composite priority of the alternatives in respect to the priority of a single criterion. Here 
are the four gradient graphs for each hierarchy: 
 
 
Figure 5.16. Gradient Sensitivity Graphs for PoF Kertih Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Gradient Sensitivity Graphs for CoF Kertih Pipeline 
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Figure 5.18. Gradient Sensitivity Graphs for PoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.19. Gradient Sensitivity Graphs for CoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
These above graphs 5.16 – 5.19, show that two criteria are mutually compared to each 
other against the alternatives in a decision. The vertical line represents priority of criterion 
selected for x axis, and the diagonal lines represent the linear relationships among 
alternatives in regards to the priority selected for the x axis. Priority of the alternative is 







5.5.4. Two Dimensional Plot 
 
The fourth graph to perform the sensitivity analysis is Two Dimensional Plot. The two 
dimensional plot shows how well the alternatives perform in respect to any two criteria. 
Here are the four two dimensional plots for each hierarchy: 
 
 
Figure 5.20. Dimensional Plot Sensitivity Graphs for PoF Kertih Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.21. Dimensional Plot Sensitivity Graphs for CoF Kertih Pipeline 
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Figure 5.22. Dimensional Plot Sensitivity Graphs for PoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.23. Dimensional Plot Sensitivity Graphs for CoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
The two dimensional plot graphs as shown in Figure 5.20 – 5.23 constitute two criteria 
compared to each other against the alternatives in a decision. Circles represents the 
alternatives, Y axis represents one criterion and the other on the X axis. The above figure 






The last graph to investigate the sensitivity analysis is Differences Sensitivity. In the 
differences graph one of the alternatives is selected in order to be compared against each 
of the other alternative. Here are the four differences graphs for each hierarchy:  
 
 
Figure 5.24. Differences Graphs for PoF Kertih Pipeline 
 
 
Figure 5.25. Differences Graphs for CoF Kertih Pipeline 
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Figure 5.27. Differences Graphs for CoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
In the differences graphs, one of the alternatives is selected to be compared to the rest of 
the other alternatives. The criteria are differentiated by current node. A bar appears on the 
graph for each criterion. If two criteria are equal, no bar is displayed. The overall result is 
displayed at the bottom of the graph and shows the overall percentage with one 
alternative is better than the other. In figure 5.27 pipelines 2 has higher probability to fail 
than pipeline 1. 
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5.5.6. Sensitivity Analysis on PoF Kertih Pipeline 
 
To carry out the performance sensitivity analysis, some scenarios are required to be 
applied to find the alternatives by increasing or decreasing the priorities. Sensitivity 
analysis is applied to the Internal Corrosion having the highest weight of 41.7% in respect 
to the goal. These are four scenarios used to find the priority changes which are 5%, -
10%, 5% and 10%. Table 5.15 shows the sensitivity on the amount of changes that may 
occur. 
Table 5.15. Sensitivity Scenario PoF Kertih Pipeline 
Scenario 
Weight of Priority (%) Sensitivity (%) 
I. Corrosion PLN 1 PLN 2 PLN 3 PLN 1 PLN 2 PLN 3 
- 10% 31.7  22.5  32.1  45.4   3.69      1.26     2.58   
- 5% 36.7  22.1  31.9   46.0    1.84     0.63     1.29    
Original 41.7  21.7  31.7  46.6  -       -      - 
5% 46.4  21.4  31.5  47.1    1.07      0.63     1.38    
10% 51.8  21.0  31.3   47.7    2.36      1.26     3.23    
 
Table 5.15 shows that by changing the scenario the results obtained have shown the 
same priority, namely less than 10%. It shows that the results obtained from the analysis 





























Figure 5.28. Sensitivity Analysis on PoF Kertih Pipeline 
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5.5.7. Sensitivity Analysis on CoF Kertih Pipeline 
 
Sensitivity analysis is performed on the major factors of Environment, having the highest 
weight of 59.4% in respect to the goal. These are four different scenarios with the 
changes of -5%, -10%, 5% and 10% to find the effects on the priority. Table 5.16 shows 
the sensitivity on the amount of changes that may occur. 
 
Table 5.16. Sensitivity Scenario CoF Kertih Pipeline 
Scenario 
Weight of Priority (%) Sensitivity (%) 
Environment PLN 1 PLN 2 PLN 3 PLN 1 PLN 2 PLN 3 
- 10% 49.4 16.9  40.4 42.7   3.05     1.22      0.23   
- 5% 54.4 16.6  40.7   42.7   1.22      0.49     0.23 
Original 59.4 16.4  40.9  42.8         -       -      - 
5% 64.4 16.1  41.1 42.8    1.83      0.49      -    
10% 69.4  15.9 41.4   42.8    3.05      1.22         -    
 
Table 5.16 shows that by changing the scenario the results obtained on Environment 
have shown the same priority of pipeline alternatives, namely less than 10%. It shows 





















































5.5.8. Sensitivity Analysis on PoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
Sensitivity analysis is performed on the major factors of System Operation, having the 
highest weight of 34.7% in respect to the goal. These are four different scenarios with the 
changes of -5%, -10%, 5% and 10% to find the effects on the priority. Table 5.17 shows 
the sensitivity on the amount of changes that may occur. 
 
Table 5.17. Sensitivity Scenario PoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
Scenario 





PLN   
2 
PLN   
3 
PLN   
4 












 -10% 24.7 17.7 20  20  22.3 19.9 5.35 0.50 0.50 3.24 2.05 
   -5% 29.7 18.2 20  20  22 19.7 2.67 0.50 0.50 1.85 1.03 
Original 34.7 18.7  20.1 20.1 21.6 19.5 - - - - - 
5% 39.7 19.2 20.1 20.1 21.3 19.4 2.67 0 0 1.39 0.51 
10% 44.6 19.7 20.1 20.1 20.9 19.2 5.35 0 0 3.24 1.54 
 
Table 5.17 shows that by changing the scenario, the results obtained on System 
Operation have shown the same priority of pipeline alternatives, namely less than 10%. 































5.5.9. Sensitivity Analysis on CoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
 
Sensitivity analysis is performed on the major factors of Business, having the highest 
weight of 60% in respect to the goal. These are four different scenarios with the changes 
of -5%, -10%, 5% and 10% to find the effects on the priority. Table 5.18 shows the 
sensitivity on the amount of changes that may occur. 
 
Table 5.18. Sensitivity Scenario CoF Kutai Basin Pipeline 
Scenario 
Weight of Priority (%) Sensitivity (%) 
Bussiness PLN  1 
PLN   
2 
PLN   
3 
PLN   
4 












  -10% 50 23.8 24.3 17.4 14.7 19.9 4.85 1.67 8.42 3.52 1.49 
   -5% 55 23.2 24.1 18.2 14.4 20.0 2.20 0.84 4.21 1.41 0.99 
Original 60 22.7 23.9 19.0 14.2 20.2 - - - - - 
5% 65 22.2 23.7 19.8 13.9 20.4 2.20 0.84 4.21 2.11 0.99 
10% 70 21.7 23.5 20.5 13.7 20.5 4.41 1.67 7.89 3.52 1.49 
 
Table 5.18 shows that by changing the scenario, the results obtained on Business have 
shown the same priority of pipeline alternatives, namely less than 10%. It shows that the 
results obtained from the analysis are suitable with the condition of the pipeline. 
  





5.6. Inspection and Maintenance Plans 
 
The above analysis helps develop a maintenance plans for the entire offshore pipelines 
network of the pipelines under study. The following maintenances are applied for 
pipelines under high risk category appropriate for maintenance plans. However based on 
the research analysis the risk category of both pipeline systems in Kertih and Kutai Basin 
is low, therefore then the inspection and maintenance below may not be considered or the 
frequency of inspection may be conducted annually.  
 
Table 5.19. Inspection and Maintenance Plans for Kertih Pipelines 
 
 





No Failure Factors Inspection and Maintenance Plans Risk Frequency 
   1. 
 
Internal 
Corrosion  Intelligent pigging     Low Annual 




 Cathodic Protection 
 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI) 
Low Annual 
   3. Internal Erosion 
 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI) Low Annual 
   4. External Impacts 
 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI) Low Annual 
   5. On Bottom Stability 
 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI) Low Annual 
   6. Free span  
 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI) Low Annual 
No Failure Factors Inspection and Maintenance Plans Risk Frequency 
   1. 
 Design Index  Intelligent pigging     Low Annual 




 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI) Low Annual 
   3. System Operation 
 General Visual Inspection 
(GVI)  
 Intelligent pigging 
Low Annual 
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5.7. Summary of Research Study 
 
This research applies Analytic Hierarchy Process in two different case studies on pipeline 
systems. The first area is in Kertih, Malaysia carrying gas and the other one is in Kutai 
Basin, Indonesia carrying oil. As explained in Chapter 4, the first framework in AHP is 
constructing the hierarchy. There are two hierarchies of each pipeline system. In order to 
find the risk, the factors that may cause the probability of failure and the impact of 
pipeline failure must be defined first. Based on the hierarchy, the analysis could be done 
through matrix pair wise comparison and the highest priority from each hierarchy is 
found. Sensitivity analysis is used to investigate how the different weight assigned to each 
factor could affect the outcomes of the hierarchy. 
 
The similarities and the differences between two pipelines can be analyzed by using 
comparative analysis. The function of comparative analysis is to find the moderation of 
two different pipeline systems. It is very important to do so because the hierarchy of risk 
pipeline failure is rather different. By doing comparative analysis, the risk of pipeline 
failure can be moderate for both pipeline systems. 
 
 Analytic Hierarchy Process has been applied in many areas, such as pipeline industry, 
construction and building, economics, safety and health. This research is trying to find the 
appropriate maintenance plans of pipeline systems by identifying the risk of pipeline 
failure. Based on the above analysis it can be seen that AHP is more complete and more 
accurate analysis than the existing method on one of pipeline system under study. 
 
Based on the previous analysis on moderation of risk pipeline failure as shown in Table 
5.9 and Table 5.10, it can be seen that pipeline 1c has tendency towards of pipeline 
failure. The probability of failure is internal corrosion with 14.7% and would give impact 
to business at the sum of 7.5%. Using AHP, the factors that lead to pipeline failure can be 
identified clearly so the proper maintenance can be determined based on the occurring 
factors. Maintenance plans can be formulated based on the risk category of pipelines. The 
advantages of pipeline maintenance based on risk analysis are to minimize inspection, 
maintenance and repair activities which could be dangerous to personnel. The other 
advantage is to maximize the availability of the pipeline system during its operational life 
and to maximize the life of pipeline. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMENDATION & CONCLUSION 
6.1. Conclusion 
 
This research is based on case study regarding the prioritization of pipeline maintenance 
with the help of risk analysis. Two pipeline systems, the one a gas pipeline system 
operated in Kertih, Malaysia and the second of oil pipeline system operated Kutai Basin, 
Indonesia are analyzed using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) model. Following are the 
conclusion drawn in view of the objective of this research. 
 
1. The first objective is to determine the greatest risk factors that govern the pipeline 
failure. Following are the main findings related to this objective: 
i. Analytical study on three gas pipeline system operated in Kertih Malaysia showed 
that the Pipeline 3 involved the highest risk factor which is obtained on the basis 
of calculation of probability and consequence of failure. Internal corrosion is 
found as the major factor that imposes highest probability of failure i.e. 41.7. The 
internal corrosion will be promoted by fluid composition and the chemical 
treatment of fluid. In the event of pipeline failure it will impact upon the 
environment that will be happened due to pollution and the pipeline size. 
ii. When the five oil pipelines in Kutai Basin are analyzed, it is determined that the 
Pipeline 2 has the highest risk of failure. The major factor that causes pipeline 
failure is system operation that is prompted by the cathodic protection, coating 
condition, metal loss defect, fluid properties and internal corrosion. The 
consequence of this failure will have significant impact on the business. 
 
Based on the comparative analysis the moderation of risk pipeline failure can 
determined for both pipeline system in Kertih and Kutai Basin. The moderation for 
probability of pipeline failure is internal corrosion, external corrosion, internal 
erosion, external impact, on bottom stability and free span. And the highest factor that 
leads to probability of failure is still the same internal corrosion. Moderation for 
consequence of failure is divided into economy, safety and consequence. The highest 
impact of pipeline failure is on economy of the pipeline industry. 
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2. Sensitivity analysis on the major factor of probability of failure and its corresponding 
consequences are performed using the change of scenario and it is obtained that 
change in priority as its impact is calculated less than 10%. 
3. The final objective is to prioritize the maintenance and inspection of the pipeline 
system. 
i. For Kertih Malaysia pipeline system maintenance strategy to be formulated based 
on intelligent pigging, cathodic protection and general visual inspection. 
ii. The maintenance plans for Kutai Basin pipeline will comprise of pigging, debris 
removal, corrosion inhibitor and general visual inspection. 
 
Since the risk category of pipeline in both pipeline system Kertih and Kutai Basin are into 
low risk  then the inspection and maintenance mentioned above may not be considered or 
the frequency of inspection may doing annually. The result of moderation Kertih pipeline 
as pipeline 1 as and Kutai Basin pipeline as pipeline 2 are based on the risk matrix below; 
 
Figure 6.1. Tendency Towards Higher Degree of Pipeline Failure 
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The highest factor that contributes in pipeline 1c, 2a and 2b have tendency towards of 
pipeline failure which is internal corrosion.  Internal corrosion is related to fluid that is 
carried by the pipeline. The internal corrosion as highest factor of probability of pipeline 
failure will be impact on economy of pipeline industry. By knowing and understand the 
risk of pipeline failure then the maintenance can be determined easily. For example the 
probability of failure is internal corrosion then the proper maintenance should be pigging. 
 
This research using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a tool to decided prioritizing 
pipeline maintenance.  AHP can formulate and calculate the risk pipeline failures which 
are probability of failure and consequence of failure. After identifying risk pipeline failure 
has been accomplish then calculate the risk category to formulate the maintenance plans. 
Compare to the existing method that applied in pipeline industry the maintenance plans 
only based on inspection and no comparing each factor. This way will performed 




This research used two case studies for the analysis application, where one could develop 
by reviewing various type of location, company and contractor. This is important to find 
the probability of pipeline failure because it will depends on the various locations and 
company to threat the pipeline for maintenance. Other recommendations may include: 
 
1. Carry out research on various type of multi criteria decision making and make 
comparison to identify the best methodology for determining risk analysis. 
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THE PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF KERTIH PIPELINE 
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A1. Probability of Failure 
 
Comparison of factors with respect to goal 













Corrosion 1 4 5 4 3 3 0.417 
External  
Corrosion 1/4 1 1/2 1/3 3 2 0.107 
Internal 
Erosion 1/5 2 1 3 2 3 0.191 
External 
Impacts ¼ 3 1/3 1 2 2 0.138 
On Bottom 
Stability 1/3 1/3 1/2 ½ 1 ½ 0.067 
Free span 1/3 1/2 1/3 ½ 2 1 0.081 
Consistency Index : 0.137 
Random Index : 1.24 
Consistency Ratio : 0.11 
 
Comparison of sub factors with respect to Internal Corrosion 
Internal 
Corrosion Fluid Composition 
Improper Chemical 
Treatment of Fluid Priority 
Fluid Composition 1 2 0.667 
Improper Chemical 
Treatment of Fluid 1/2 1 0.333 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 0 
Consistency Ratio : 0 
 










Coating 1 2 2 0.493 
Damage 
Anodes 1/2 1 2 0.311 
Defect From 
Construction 1/2 1/2 1 0.196 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 





Comparison of sub factors with respect to Internal Erosion 
Internal 
Erosion Flow Characteristic Pipeline Design Priority 
Flow Characteristic 1 1/3 0.25 
Pipeline Design 3 1 0.75 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 0 
Consistency Ratio : 0 
 




Dropped Objects Fish Bombing Priority 
Impacts from 
Dropped Objects 1 2 0.667 
Fish Bombing 1/2 1 0.333 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 0 
Consistency Ratio : 0 
 
 Comparison of sub factors with respect to On Bottom Stability 
On Bottom Stability Seabed Movement 
Loss of Weight 
Coating Priority 
Seabed Movement 1 3 0.75 
Loss of Weight 
Coating 1/3 1 0.25 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 0 
Consistency Ratio : 0 
  
 Comparison of sub factors with respect to Freespan 






Seabed Scouring 1 3 2 0.550 
Pipeline On 
Bottom Instability 1/3 1 1 0.210 
Seabed 
Undulations 1/2 1 1 0.240 
Consistency Index : 0.0116 
Random Index : 0.58 
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Comparison of alternative with respect to Fluid Composition 
Fluid C. Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.140 
Pipeline 2 3 1 1/2 0.333 
Pipeline 3 3 2 1 0.528 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Improper Chemical Treatment of Fluid 
Improper 
Chemical    Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 ½ 0.24 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1/3   0.21 
Pipeline 3 2 3 1 0.55 
Consistency Index : 0.01 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.02 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Damage Coating 
Damage 
Coating 
Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 0.327 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1/2 0.260 
Pipeline 3 1 2 1 0.413 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Damage Anodes 
Damage 
Anodes Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 1/3 0.151 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/4 0.218 
Pipeline 3 3 4 1 0.630 
Consistency Index : 0.06 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.1 
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Comparison of alternative with respect to Defect from Construction 
Defect from 
Construction Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 1/3 0.157 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/3 0.249 
Pipeline 3 3 3 1 0.594 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Flow Characteristic 
Flow 
Characteristic Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 1/3 0.157 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/3 0.249 
Pipeline 3 3 3 12 0.594 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
  
 Comparison of alternative with respect to Pipeline Design 
Pipeline Design Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 2 0.297 
Pipeline 2 2 1 3 0.540 
Pipeline 3 1/2 1/3 1 0.163 
Consistency Index : 0.01 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.01 
 
 Comparison of alternative with respect to Impact from Dropped Objects 
Impact from 
Dropped O. Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 ½ 0.196 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/2 0.311 
Pipeline 3 2 2 1 0.492 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
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Comparison of alternative with respect to Fish Bombing 
Fish Bombing Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 0.327 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1/2 0.260 
Pipeline 3 1 2 1 0.413 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
  
 Comparison of alternative with respect to Seabed Movement 
Seabed 
Movement Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 ½ 0.190 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/3 0.263 
Pipeline 3 2 3 1 0.547 
Consistency Index : 0.08 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.13 
 
   
Comparison of alternative with respect to Loss of Weight Coating 
Loss of Weight 
Coating Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 2 2 0.493 
Pipeline 2 ½ 1 2 0.311 
Pipeline 3 1/2 1/2 1 0.196 
Consistency Index : 0.03 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Seabed Scouring  
Seabed 
Scouring  Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 1/3 0.163 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/2 0.297 
Pipeline 3 3 2 1 0.540 
Consistency Index : 0.01 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.01 
 










Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 ½ 0.240 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1/3 0.210 
Pipeline 3 2 3 1 0.550 
Consistency Index : 0.01 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.02 
 
   
Comparison of alternative with respect to Seabed Undulations 
Seabed 
Undulations Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 ½ 0.190 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1/3 0.263 
Pipeline 3 2 3 1 0.547 
 Consistency Index : 0.08 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.13 
 
A2. Consequence of Failure 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Goal 
Goal Economic Safety Environmental Priority 
Economic 1 2 1/3 0.249 
Safety 1/2 1 1/3 0.157 
Environmental 3 3 1 0.594 
 Consistency Index : 0.029 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Economic 
Economic Repair Cost Business Loss Priority 
Repair Cost 1 1/3 0.250 
Business Loss 3 1 0.750 
Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 






Comparison of alternative with respect to Safety 
Economic Product Transported    Manning On Installation Priority 
Product 
Transported  1 3 0.750 
Manning On 
Installation 1/3 1 0.250 
 Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Environmental 
Environmental Pollution  Pipeline Size Priority 
Pollution 1 1 0.500 
  Pipeline Size 1 1 0.500 
Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Repair Cost 
Repair Cost Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.143 
Pipeline 2 3 1 1 0.429 
Pipeline 3 3 1 1 0.429 
 Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Business Loss 
Business Loss Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 1/2 0.200 
Pipeline 2 2 1 1  0.400 
Pipeline 3 2 1 1 0.400 
 Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 










Comparison of alternative with respect to Product Transported 
Product 
Transported Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1  1/3 1/3 0.140 
Pipeline 2 3 1 1/2 0.333 
Pipeline 3 3 2 1 0.528 
 Consistency Index :  0.029 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Manning On Installation 
Manning On Installation Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 0.333 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 0.333 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 0.333 
 Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Pollution 
Pollution Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.143 
Pipeline 2 3 1 1 0.429 
Pipeline 3 2 1 1 0.429 
 Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Pipeline Size 
Pipeline Size Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/3 1/3 0.143 
Pipeline 2 3 1 1 0.429 
Pipeline 3 3 1 1 0.429 
 Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
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B1. Probability of Failure 
 
Comparison of factors with respect to goal 




Operation Maintenance Priority 
Design Index 1 2 1/2 1 0.237 
Third Party 
Index 1/2 1 1 1/2 0.180 
System 
Operation 2 1 1 2 0.347 
Maintenance 1 2 1/2 1 0.237 
Consistency Index : 0.081 
Random Index : 0.90 
Consistency Ratio : 0.09 
 
  Comparison of sub factors with respect to Design Index 
Design Index Age Operating Pressure Priority 
Age 1 2 0.667 
Operating Pressure 1/2 1 0.333 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 0 
Consistency Ratio : 0 
 
  Comparison of sub factors with respect to Third Party Index 




Pipeline A.  Priority 
ROW Condition 1 1 ½ 0.232 
Patrol Frequency 1 1 1/4 0.184 
Above Pipeline Activity 2 4 1 0.584 
 Consistency Index : 0.029 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.05 
 
  Comparison of factors with respect to System Operation 










Protection 1 1 1/2 1 1/3 0.125 
Coating Condition 1 1 1/2 1 1/3 0.125 
Metal Loss 2 2 1 2 1/2 0.239 
Fluid Properties 1 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.138 
Internal Corrosion 3 3 2 2 1 0.373 
Consistency Index : 0.011 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.01 
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Comparison of sub factors with respect to Maintenance 
Maintenance  Pigging  Debris Corrosion Inhibitor Priority 
Pigging 1 1 1 0.333 
Debris 1 1 1 0.333 
Corrosion 
Inhibitor 1 1 1 0.333 
 Consistency Index : 0.00 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
 Comparison of alternative with respect to Age 
Age Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1/3 1/4 1/3 0.085 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1/2 1/3 1/2 0.106 
Pipeline 3 3 2 1 1/2 1 0.216 
Pipeline 4 4 3 2 1 2 0.377 
Pipeline 5 3 2 1 1/2 1 0.216 
Consistency Index : 0.012 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.01 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Operating Pressure 
Operating 
Pressure Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 3 4 2 0.325 
Pipeline 2 1 1 3 2 3 0.316 
Pipeline 3 1/3 1/3 1 1 1/2 0.096 
Pipeline 4 1/4 ½ 1 1 1/2 0.101 
Pipeline 5 1/2 1/3 2 2 1 0.161 
Consistency Index : 0.0224 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.02 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to ROW Condition 
ROW 
Condition Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
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Comparison of alternative with respect to Patrol Frequency 
Patrol 
Frequency Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 0.059 
Pipeline 2 4 1 1 1 1 0.235 
Pipeline 3 4 1 1 1 1 0.235 
Pipeline 4 4 1 1 1 1 0.235 
Pipeline 5 4 1 1 1 1 0.235 
Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.0 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Above Pipeline Activity 
Above 
Pipeline A. Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 0.027 
Pipeline 2 9 1 1 1 1 0.243 
Pipeline 3 9 1 1 1 1 0.243 
Pipeline 4 9 1 1 1 1 0.243 
Pipeline 5 9 1 1 1 1 0.243 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Cathodic Protection 
Cathodic 
Protection Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 5 5 0.294 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 5 5 0.294 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 5 5 0.294 
Pipeline 4 1/5 1/5 1/5 1 1 0.059 
Pipeline 5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1 1 0.059 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Coating Condition 
Coating 
Condition Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 




Comparison of alternative with respect to Metal Loss Defect 
  Metal Loss 
Defect Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
 Comparison of alternative with respect to Fluid Properties 
Fluid 
Properties Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 4 4 4 4 0.500 
Pipeline 2 1/4 1 1 1 1 0.125 
Pipeline 3 1/4 1 1 1 1 0.125 
Pipeline 4 1/4 1 1 1 1 0.125 
Pipeline 5 1/4 1 1 1 1 0.125 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Internal Corrosion 
Internal 
Corrosion Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
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Comparison of alternative with respect to Pigging 
Pigging Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Debris Removal 
Debris Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Corrosion Inhibitor 
Corrosion 
Inhibitor Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0 
Random Index : 1.12 













B2. Consequence of Failure 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Goal 
Goal Business Environment Population Priority 
Business 1 3 3 0.600 
Environment 1/3 1 1  0.200 
Population 1/3 1 1 0.200 
Consistency Index : 0.0 
Random Index : 0.58 
Consistency Ratio : 0.00 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Business 
Business Sales Line Redundancy Oil Flow Volume Priority 
Sales Line 1 3 2 2 0.415 
Redundancy 1/3 1 1/3 1/2 0.107 
Oil Flow 1/2 3 1 2 0.293 
Volume 1/2 2 1/2 1 0.185 
Consistency Index : 0.034 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.03 
 
Comparison of alternative with respect to Environment (Property Damage) 
Property 
Damage Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 7 7 3 3 0.479 
Pipeline 2 1/7 1 1 1/5 1/5 0.049 
Pipeline 3 1/7 1 1 1/5 1/5 0.049 
Pipeline 4 1/3 5 5 1 1 0.211 
Pipeline 5 1/3 5 5 1 1 0.211 
Consistency Index : 0.022 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.02 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Population  
Population Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/4 1 1 1 0.124 
Pipeline 2 4 1 4 4 4 0.495 
Pipeline 3 1 1/4 1 1/2 1/2 0.096 
Pipeline 4 1 1/4 2 1 1 0.143 
Pipeline 5 1 1/4 2 1 1 0.143 
Consistency Index : 0.022 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.02 
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Comparison of alternative with respect to Sales Line 
Sales Line Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 4 1/2 5 2 0.289 
Pipeline 2 1/4 1 1/5 1 1/5 0.060 
Pipeline 3 2 5 1 5 1 0.339 
Pipeline 4 1/5 1 1/5 1 1/5 0.057 
Pipeline 5 1/2 5 1 5 1 0.256 
Consistency Index : 0.045 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.04 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Redundancy 
Redundancy Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/9 1/9 1/8 1/9 0.027 
Pipeline 2 9 1 1 1 2 0.283 
Pipeline 3 9 1 1 1 1 0.241 
Pipeline 4 8 1 1 1 1 0.236 
Pipeline 5 9 1/2 1 1 1 0.213 
Consistency Index : 0.011 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.01 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Oil Flow 
Oil Flow Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/3 1 1 1/2 0.118 
Pipeline 2 3 1 4 4 4 0.477 
Pipeline 3 1 1/4 1 2 1 0.146 
Pipeline 4 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 0.111 
Pipeline 5 2 1/4 1 1 1 0.148 
Consistency Index : 0.034 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.03 
 
  Comparison of alternative with respect to Volume 
Volume Pipeline 1 Pipeline 2 Pipeline 3 Pipeline 4 Pipeline 5 Priority 
Pipeline 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 0.171 
Pipeline 2 2 1 2 1 1 0.264 
Pipeline 3 1 1/2 1 1 1 0.171 
Pipeline 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.197 
Pipeline 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.197 
Consistency Index : 0.022 
Random Index : 1.12 
Consistency Ratio : 0.02 
 
